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 During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
fundamental changes in economic thought revolutionized the theory of 
corporate finance, leading to changes in its legal regulation.  The changes 
were massive, and this branch of financial analysis and law became 
virtually unrecognizable to those who had practiced it earlier.  In brief, the 
theory of corporate finance went through the same marginalist revolution 
that divides classical political economy from neoclassical economics. 
 
 The waning days of classical corporate finance were represented in 
the work of the Progressive "Muckrakers," who wrote detailed exposures of 
financial scandals that occurred during the Gilded Age,1 calling attention to 
what they saw as an indefensible maldistribution of wealth and power in the 
United States.2  The muckrakers' principal target was the large American 
business corporation, then of relatively recent vintage, as well as the men 
who controlled them, including John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie and 
railroad magnates Cornelius Vanderbilt and Jay Gould.  For example, 
Charles Francis Adams wrote a series of articles in the North American 
Review exposing the great Erie Railroad stock scandal of the 1860's.3  
                                                 
*.  Ben V. & Dorothy Willie Professor or Law, Univ. of Iowa.  The dates given in 
the title are more-or-less arbitrary.  At the beginning, the first major work of English 
neoclassical marginalism was Arthur Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political 
Economy (1871).  At the end, Eugene F. Fama's doctoral dissertation, often 
credited with assembling the data and proofs that created the modern efficient 
capital market hypothesis (ECMH), was published as Eugene F. Fama, The 
Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J.Bus. 34 (1965).  See Herbert Hovenkamp, 
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control,  
1.  Roughly 1870-1900, and named after a book by Mark Twain about the 
financial excesses and inequalities of the period.  Mark Twain and Charles Dudley 
Warner, The Gilded Age: A Tale of Today (1873). 
2.  See Walter M. Brasch, Forerunners of Revolution: Muckrakers and the 
American Social Conscience (1990); Arthur Ekirch, The Decline of American 
Liberalism 58-63 (1955); Louis Filler, The Muckrakers: Crusaders for American 
Liberalism (1968). 
3.  See Adams, The Railroad System, 104 N.Am.Rev. 476 (1867); Adams, 
Legislative Control over Railway Charters, 1 Am.L.Rev. 451 (1867);  Adams, The 
Erie Railroad Row, 3 Am.L.Rev. 41 (1868); Adams, Railroad Inflation, 108 
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Three decades later Ida Tarbell's History of Standard Oil excoriated the 
financial dealings of John D. Rockefeller and his corporation.4 
 
 The story of the Erie Railroad became a model application of 
classical corporate finance theory used to expose a great scandal.  Here a 
giant corporation robbed both stock purchasers and creditors by 
committing financial fraud through the issuance of "watered" stock. 
 
 Classical corporate finance theory rested on a model of absolute 
unity of the corporation and its shareholders.  Shareholders were regarded 
as in control and were directly liable for shortcomings, although they could 
be duped by management.  Within this classical conception of corporate 
finance a corporation was valued by the amount of capital that the 
proprietors, or founding shareholders, paid in when a corporation was 
formed or when additional shares were issued.  Stock was said to be 
"watered" when its stated value exceeded the amount of capital that had 
actually been paid in to the corporation.  For example, at the time a 
corporation formed its shareholders might issue 10,000 shares of stock at a 
stated par value of $10 per share.  Disclosure of these numbers to future 
investors, whether creditors or subsequent share purchasers, operated as 
a guarantee that 10 multiplied by 10,000, or $100,000, had been paid in to 
the capital of the corporation.  This amount was presumed to be the 
corporation's value.  Further, it assured creditors that there was a fund that 
they could turn to in the event of a default.  If the product of the number of 
shares and the stated par value exceeded the amount of capital actually 
paid in then the stock was said to be "watered" by the amount of the 
excess.  Under classical finance theory, when stock was watered both 
minority or subsequently purchasing shareholders as well as creditors 
could be duped into thinking that a corporation was much more valuable 
than it really was. 
 
 William W. Cook, author of the most prominent corporate law 
treatise of the late nineteenth century, defended this traditional conception 
of par value and explained the problem of "watered" stock this way: 
 
 A share of stock is supposed, in theory, to represent its par value in 
                                                                                                                            
N.Am.Rev. 130 (1869);  Adams, A Chapter of Erie, 109 N.Am.Rev 30-106 (1870); 
Adams, Railway Problems in 1869, 110 N.Am.REV 116 (1970); Adams, Railway 
Commissions, 2 J.Soc.Sci 233-236 (1870); Adams, The Government and the 
Railroad Corporations, 112 N. Am.Rev 31 (1871).  On Adams' career in railroad 
regulation, see Thomas K. McCraw, Prophets of Regulation, ch. 1 (1984). 
4.  Ida M. Tarbell, History of the Standard Oil Company (1904). 
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money or money's worth, paid in or to be paid in to the corporation. 
. . . 
 All stock which has been issued as paid-up stock, but whose full par 
value has not been paid in to the corporation in money or money's 
worth, is watered to the extent that the par value exceeds the value 
actually paid in.5 
 
 Cook, whose views represented the ideology of the New York 
corporate bar during its late nineteenth century ascendancy,6 largely 
reconstituted the publicly traded business corporation as a routine 
investment device for shareholders, rather than as a special prerogative of 
the state as earlier corporate law writing had tended to do.  As such Cook's 
treatise was strongly focused on the rights of stockholders and their 
potential abuse at the hands of unscrupulous managers, whose interests 
he tended to see as inconsistent with those of the corporation.7  It was 
                                                 
5.  William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General 
Corporation Law '21 at 28-29 (2d ed. 1889). 
 
 On Cook, Alfred F. Conard, Cook and the Corporate Shareholder: A 
Belated Review of William W. Cook's Publications on Corporations, 93 Mich.L.Rev. 
1724 (1995).  On Cook's life see the University of Michigan Law School's website, 
http://www.law.umich.edu/library/cook/Pages/default.aspx.  Cook's gift of his entire 
fortune to that law school enabled the University of Michigan to build its law school 
Quadrangle. 
6.  See Robert Gordon, Legal Thought and legal Practice in the Age of 
American Enterprise, 1870-1920," in Professions and Professional Ideologies in 
America, 1730-1940 (Gerald L. Geison, ed. 1983); Morton J. Horwitz, The 
Transformation of American Law, 1870-1960: the Crisis of Legal Orthodoxy (1992); 
William Wiecek, The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in 
America, 1886-1937 (1998). 
7.  See Conard, note __ at 1726-1727.  Writing during a period of widespread 
stock scandal, Cook said: 
 
  Corporations, with their vast capital stock, their great income, their 
rapidly changing personal property, and their large purchases and 
sales, have proved to be a temptation which corporate officers are 
too often unable to withstand. These companies have been found 
to be efficient instruments of fraud, speculation, plunder, and 
illegal gain. In these latter days the robbery and spoliation of 
corporations and stockholders by the corporate directors and 
managers have been systematized into well-known methods of 
proceeding, and the carrying out of such plans has become a 
profession and an accomplishment. The skill, audacity, 
experience, and talent of the highest order of administrative ability 
have reduced to a certainty the methods of diverting profits, 
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largely the eventual failure of Cook's ideal that led to the separation of 
ownership and corporate control that Berle and Means described in their 
New Deal book on the business corporation.8 
 
 As the Pennsylvania Supreme Court stated the classical view of 
corporate valuation in 1889, the "meaning of the word 'value,' and the basis 
on which the idea of value rests" is the representation made on the stock 
certificate of that which has been contributed.  The stock certificate 
 
 stands in the hands of the subscriber for so much as, and no more 
than, the amount actually paid upon it.9 
 
 Classical corporate finance theory was designed to be applied 
under common law rules of contract and fraud.  Computing corporate value 
under the theory was largely a matter of bookkeeping.  As a result the rules 
were regarded as self-executing, in the sense that any reasonable 
manager could comply with them and challenges could be made when 
appropriate in a common law court.  If the paid-in capital had taken the 
form of cash one could easily determine whether the stated par value of 
outstanding shares was supported by cash that had actually been paid in.  
Difficulties in judgment could arise if the payments had been made in 
noncash property such as real estate or other productive assets or 
intellectual property rights, for there could be questions about 
overvaluation.  However, the common law of fraud was well designed to 
deal with such deceptions.10  The courts tended to give the incorporators 
                                                                                                                            
capital, and even the existence of the corporation itself, to the 
enrichment of the corporate managers and their co-conspirators. 
Corporations become insolvent and stockholders lose their 
investments, while individuals become millionaires. Illegitimate 
gains are secured and enormous fortunes are amassed by the few 
at the expense of the defrauded, but generally helpless, 
stockholders. 
 
William W. Cook, A Treatise on Stock and Stockholders and General 
Corporation Law 667 (2d ed. 1889). 
8.  Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property 159 (1932). 
9.  Appeal of Lehigh Ave. Rwy. Co., 18 A. 498, 499, 129 Pa. 405 (1889). 
10.  Gillett v Chicago Title & Trust Co., 230 Ill 373, 82 N.E. 891, 904-05 (1907) 
(rights to an unwritten play and several unpatented inventions deemed valueless 
by court, so that stock received for these intangibles "remained wholly unpaid"); 
Garden City Sand Co. v. Crematory Co., 205 Ill. 42, 68 N.E. 724 1903) ("nearly 
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the benefit of the doubt if the evaluation had been made in good faith, even 
though subsequently proven wrong.  As the Supreme Court observed in an 
1886 decision: 
 
 If it were proved that actual fraud was committed in the payment of 
the stock, and that the complainant had given credit to the company 
from a belief that its stock was fully paid, there would undoubtedly 
be substantial ground for the relief asked. But where the charter 
authorizes capital stock to be paid in property, and the shareholders 
honestly and in good faith put in property instead of money in 
payment of their subscriptions, third parties have no ground of 
complaint. The case is very different from that in which 
subscriptions to stock are payable in cash, and where only a part of 
the installments has been paid. In that case there is still a debt due 
to the corporation, which, if it become insolvent, may be 
sequestered in equity by the creditors, as a trust fund liable to the 
payment of their debts. But where full-paid stock is issued for 
property received, there must be actual fraud in the transaction to 
enable creditors of the corporation to call the stockholders to 
account. A gross and obvious overvaluation of property would be 
strong evidence of fraud.11 
 
 This self-executing nature of classical corporate finance theory was 
essential if the financial relationships among a corporation's managers, 
shareholders and creditors were to be governed by common law rules in 
courts of general jurisdiction.  In the nineteenth century states were 
generally loathe to create regulatory agencies.  But during the Gilded Age 
business corporations grew very large in terms of revenue, number and 
nature of shareholders.  Further, their financial dealings grew far more 
complex than anything known in the earlier part of the century, save for 
                                                                                                                            
worthless" patent valued at over $50,000 established that stock was watered: 
 
 "Money or money's worth" means cash or its equivalent. If the directors 
saw fit to accept property in lieu of cash, they could only take it at its fair 
cash market value, if it was property which had an ascertainable market 
value. If it had no ascertainable market value, then the only price at which 
the directors could purchase it was such price as could be realized by 
selling it to others for cash. 
11.  See, e.g., Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 344-345 (1886).  
See also Boynton v. Hatch, 2 Sickels 224, 47 N. Y. 225 (N.Y. 1872) (creditor 
entitled to prove that incorporators grossly overstated value of paid in property); 
Carr v. Le Fevre, 27 Pa. 413 (1856) (contribution of coal mining property at its 
appraised value was proper so long as no reason existed for thinking that the 
appraisal had been fraudulently conducted or obtained). 
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some railroad corporations. 
 
 The number of watered stock scandals increased dramatically 
during the early twentieth century, culminating in a major wave during the 
period 1917-1920, and another one just at the onset of the Great 
Depression.  In the meanwhile, nearly every state responded with 
regulatory legislation.  Between 1911 and 1931, 47 out of 48 states passed 
"blue sky" statutes, of which more will be said later.12  Given that general 
business incorporation statutes had been around for well over half a 
century by this time, the sudden passage of these laws in a brief period 
seems perplexing.  The statutes generally required registration of securities 
and sales personnel, the provision of detailed financial information to 
prospective purchasers, as well as a state official's prior approval of new 
stock offerings.13 
 
 One explanation of the sudden growth of blue sky laws during this 
period is that they were special interest legislation intended to protect 
mainly small banks who were losing investments in the form of savings 
deposits to securities, and thus losing profits to underwriters.  The banks 
themselves were regulated by state law limiting their own business 
severely, and the blue sky laws were intended to make the securities less 
attractive.14  Others have argued that the statutes were nothing more than 
long overdue reforms.15  Or, relatedly, they may have been a response to 
                                                 
12.  See discussion infra, text at notes __; and see Paul G. Mahoney, the 
Origins of the Blue-Sky Laws: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 46 J.L.Econ. 229 
(2003); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 
Tex. L. Rev. 347 (1991); and see  Louis Loss & Edward M. Cowett, Blue Sky Laws 
(1958). 
13.  See Mahoney, id. at 230-232 (detailing several provisions and providing a 
table organized by adoption date and provisions). 
14.  See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 
70 Tex. L. Rev. 347, 365 (1991).  Cf. Mahoney, note __, which sees a much more 
complex set of causes, mainly political, in which the relative power of small bank 
lobbying seemed to affect the type of statute that was passed but numerous other 
factors were important as well. 
 
 See also George Benston, The Value of the SEC's Accounting Disclosure 
Requirements, 44 Acct. Rev. 515 (1969) (arguing that the regulation was inefficient 
because the cost of disclosure requirements exceed their value); George J. 
Benston, Corporate Financial Disclosure in the UK and the USA (1976) (similar). 
15.  Joel Seligman, The Historical Need for a Mandatory Corporate Disclosure 
System, 9 J.Corp.L. 1 (1983).  See also Joel Seligman, The Transformation of Wall 
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the recent rise of the modern national securities markets, which required 
investor confidence,16 but also entailed that shareholders were even less 
involved in corporate affairs than they had been before, and thus needed 
some more protection from the state.17 
 
 I believe that the "watered" stock scandals of the late nineteenth 
and early twentieth century and the subsequent calls for increased 
regulation were a natural result of a different way of thinking about the 
financing and value of the business corporation.  The source of this 
revision was the marginalist, or neoclassical, revolution in economic 
thought.  The classical theory had seen corporate finance as a backward 
looking, relatively self-executing inquiry based on the classical theory of 
value.  By contrast, neoclassical value theory was forward looking and as a 
result a much more realistic way of assessing a corporation's value; but it 
also required more prediction and interpretation, and thus was subject to 
more abuse.  That possibility led the states first and later the federal 
government to respond with regulatory legislation. 
 
 While marginalism effected a sweeping change in regulatory 
attitudes toward the corporation, the changes in the basic theory of 
corporate behavior, and thus of finance, were at least as striking.  The 
marginalist revolution turned the corporation into a rational actor intent on 
maximizing value.  Within this model the idiosyncratic preferences of not 
only shareholders but also of creditors and even managers became largely 
irrelevant.  Or to say it differently, the neoclassical concept of the 
corporation did not merely separate ownership from control; it separated 
corporate decision making from all human preference whatsoever, unless 
                                                                                                                            
Street: A History of the Securities and Exchange Commission and Modern 
Corporate Finance 19, 20, 38 (1982). 
16.  Thomas R. Navin and Marian V. Sears, The Rise of a Market for Industrial 
Securities, 1887-1902, 29 Bus.His.Rev. 105 (1955).  See also Naomi R. 
Lamoreaux and Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, "Corporate Governance and the Plight of 
Minority Shareholders in the United States before the Great Depression 125, in 
Corruption and Reform: Lessons from America's Economic History (Edward L. 
Glaeser and Claudia Goldin, eds.  Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2006). 
17.  See John Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: the Roles of Law and 
State in the Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001); Mark J. 
Roe, Political Preconditions to Separating Ownership from Corporate Control, 53 
Stan.L.Rev. 539, 585-587 (2000); William G. Roy, Socializing Capital: the Rise of 
the Large Industrial Corporation in America 16-18 (1997); Alfred D. Chandler, 
Scale and Scope: the Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism 144-145 (1990).  See also 
Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American 
Corporate Finance (1994). 
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those preferences were simply asserted to be maximization of value.  
Within the neoclassical model the separate human identities of 
shareholders or even managers came to matter only under the rubric of 
"agency costs," which were regarded as nothing more than an imperfection 
in the neoclassical corporate ideal. 
 
The Classical Theory of Corporate Finance 
 
 Before the twentieth century corporate finance was regulated 
mainly by the common law of contract and fraud.  Further, the substantive 
rules of finance were distinctly "classical," in the sense that they borrowed 
their ideas from the classical political economists -- mainly Adam Smith, 
David Ricardo, and John Stuart Mill.  The principal difference between the 
classicists and the neoclassicists that followed them is that for the former 
value was measured objectively based on historical averages, while for 
neoclassicists it was subjective and based on future expectations. 
 
 The classicists believed that value was not a function of human 
desire, but rather of cost, which consisted mainly of the labor that went into 
something.  The defining characteristic of this theory of value is that it was 
backward looking in time.  One measured value by asking what had been 
contributed.  Any time one tried to take more out than the historical 
contribution, the effect was to weaken the firm and perhaps eventually 
send it to ruin. As Adam Smith once stated, "The real price of everything, 
what everything really costs to the man who wants to acquire it, is the toil 
and trouble of acquiring it.... 18  That is, one started with raw materials and 
any additional value added was the cost of the labor that went into it.  For 
the business firm value then consisted of the firm's capital plus the added 
value provided by labor.19 
 
 The paradigm example of classical value theory applied to policy 
                                                 
18.  Adam Smith, An Inquiry Into the Nature and Causes of the Wealth of 
Nations 13 ([1776] reprint edition: Chicago, Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 1952). 
19.  See also id. at 563: 
 
  [T]he value of [gold and silver] has, in all ages and nations, arisen 
chiefly from their scarcity, and that their scarcity has arisen from the very 
small quantities of them which nature has any where deposited in one 
place, from the hard and intractable substance with which she has almost 
every where surrounded those small quantities, and consequently from the 
labour and expence which are every where necessary in order to 
penetrate and get at them. 
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was the wage-fund doctrine.  David Ricardo, who wrote mainly in the early 
nineteenth century, argued that "The value of a commodity, or the quantity 
of any other commodity for which it will exchange, depends on the relative 
quantity of labour which is necessary for its production...."20  As a result, 
 
 If the corn is to be divided between the farmer and the labourer, the 
larger the proportion that is given to the latter, the less will remain 
for the former. So if cloth or cotton goods be divided between the 
workman and his employer, the larger the proportion given to the 
former, the less remains for the latter.21 
 
 Under the wage-fund doctrine the amount of wages that could be 
paid in the current period was always a function of the amount of "surplus" 
that remained from the previous period.  The classical idea of a wages fund 
was highly intuitive.  For example, the farmer working his field this year 
necessarily had to live off that which he had produced during the prior year.  
If nothing was left over he would starve before he brought the current crops 
to harvest.22  The moral that the classicists drew is that the rate of wages to 
be paid in the current period could not exceed the amount in a "fund" that 
represented the accumulated surplus capital of the previous years.  This 
fund then had to be divided among workers.23  Any attempt to pay more 
would deplete the fund and impair the firm's capital. 
 
 Today we are inclined to see the wage-fund doctrine as silly and 
myopically backward looking, but that is only because we are conditioned 
by a lifetime of looking at the economic world though a forward looking 
neoclassical lens.  Clearly, the value of wages does not depend on the size 
of a historical fund but rather on the employer's prediction of how much 
value an additional worker will add to her profits.  If the incremental 
contribution of a laborer is $10 per hour, then any wage up to $10 an hour 
will be profitable for the employer. 
 
                                                 
20.  David Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation 11 [3d ed. 
1821] (reprinted as vol. 1 of Piero Sraffa ed., The Works and Correspondence of 
David Ricardo (Cambridge University Press, 1951). 
21.  Id. at 35. 
22.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1780-1860, at 
ch. 16 (1991). 
23.  See, e.g., William G. Sumner, "Protective Taxes and Wages," 136 N. Am. 
Rev. 270, 271 (1883) "[c]hanges in rates of wages can only be produced by 
changes in the amount of capital distributable as wages, or by changes in the 
number of persons competing for wages." 
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 But that distinctly "marginalist" way of assessing value was 
unknown to the classicists.  Yale political economist William Graham 
Sumner, one of the staunchest defenders of the wage-fund doctrine, 
berated the emerging marginal theory of wages for suggesting "that a man 
who was tilling the ground in June could eat the crop he expected to have 
in September, or that a tailor could be wearing the coat which he was 
making."24  Within twenty years of Sumner's comment, however, the wage-
fund doctrine was widely regarded as completely exploded, replaced with 
the idea that the marginal rate of wages is driven mainly by the anticipated 
marginal rate of contribution that an employee makes to his employer.  In 
Britain, John Stuart Mill repudiated the doctrine in 1869 and all of the 
British marginalists rejected it.25  In the United States MIT economist 
Francis Walker also repudiated the doctrine in the 1870s.26  Most other 
United States economists fell in line behind him before the end of the 
century.27 
 
 The classical theory of corporate finance was based on analogous 
principles.  The rise of the modern American business corporation began 
during the Jackson era with the development of the first general business 
incorporation statutes.  The thrust of these statutes was to change the 
status of the business corporation from a special prerogative or franchise of 
the sovereign, such as a public utility or transportation service, to an 
ordinary and typical method of doing business.28 
                                                 
24.  William G. Sumner, "Wages," in Collected Essays in Political and Social 
Science 36, 50 (1885). 
25.  John Stuart Mill, "Book Review," in 5 Collected Works 680 (J. Robson ed. 
1967) see Robert B. Ekelund, "A Short-Run Classical Model of Capital and Wages: 
Mill's Recantation of the Wages Fund," 28 Oxford Econ. Papers 66 (1976).  See 
also Walter Stanley Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy 257-258 (1871); 
Alfred Marshall, "The Theory of Business Profits," 1 Q. J. Econ. 477 (1887); 
Marshall, "Wages and Profits," 2 Q. J. Econ. 218 (1888); Marshall, Principles of 
Economics 567 (1890). 
26.  Francis Walker, "The Wage-Fund Theory," 120 N. Am. Rev. 84, 102 
(1875); see also Walker, The Wages Question 142-144, 405-406 (1876). 
27.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Political Economy of Substantive Due 
Process, 40 Stan. L. Rev. 379, 435 (1988).  This included John Bates Clark, 
perhaps the leading technical economist in the United States at this time.  See 
John Bates Clark, "The Possibility of a Scientific Law of Wages," 4 Publications 
Am. Econ. Assn. 39, 49 (1889). 
28.  See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at Chs. 1-6. 
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 The corporation was a "person" in the eyes of the law, and 
eventually even under the United States Constitution.29  This meant that it 
owned its own assets and carried its own liability, posted its earnings and 
disbursements to its own account, made decisions in its own name about 
the extent to which surplus would be paid out as dividends to shareholders 
or invested for future production, borrowed money for future development 
in its own name, and appeared in court in its own name as both plaintiff 
and defendant.  Shareholders were owners who could come and go, but 
the corporation as an economic entity was intended to be stable. 
 
 The classical theory of corporate finance was beguilingly simple 
and began with the premise that the corporation was a "person" whose 
financial resources and obligations should be treated no differently than the 
ledger or bank account of a biological person.  Consistent with the classical 
theory, the value of a corporation was thought to be the amount that had 
been paid in in the past, much like a person's worth is a function of 
historically obtained assets.  Thus the general incorporation statutes 
typically specified that a business firm could incorporate only upon 
payment into the corporation of a specified amount of capital.30  If the 
declared par value of all the issued shares was significantly greater than 
the paid in capital the stock was said to be "watered," a term that derived 
from ranchers' practice of salting and overwatering cattle in order to 
increase their weight prior to sale.31  Watering of stock most typically 
occurred when the incorporators exaggerated the value of property that 
was contributed to the corporation at the time of its formation. 
 
 Both the common law and the early general incorporation acts 
approached the problem of watered stock by removing limited shareholder 
liability to one degree or another.32  Most famously, in 1824 Justice Story 
riding circuit developed the "trust fund" doctrine, which was adopted by the 
                                                 
29.  Santa Clara Co. v. Southern Pacific Railroad, 118 U.S. 394, 396 (1886) 
(corporation a "person" for purposes of Fourteenth Amendment).  See also 
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __, Ch. 4; Morton J. Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: 
the Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 174 (1985). 
30.  See, e.g., Oscar Handlin & Mary Handlin, Commonwealth: A Study of the 
Role of Government in the American Economy: Massachusetts, 1774-1861 at 144-
150 (1941; rev. ed. 1969) (focusing on Massachusetts). 
31.  See Frederick Tung, Before Competition: Origins of the Internal Affairs 
Doctrine, 32 J.Corp.L. 33, 91 n. 293 (2006) 
32.  On the progression of legal doctrine, see Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ 
at 49-64. 
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Supreme Court a half century later.33  The doctrine provided that a fictional 
trust existed against the assets of shareholders who paid less into the 
corporation than the declared value indicated.  In short, stockholders could 
face personal liability to the extent of any shortfall between stated and 
actual paid-in value.  Several states provided for some variation of the 
same thing by statute.34  For example, the highly influential New York 
General Incorporation Act of 1848 assessed double liability against 
shareholders when actual paid in capital was less than the stated value.35 
 
 The economic basis of the watered stock doctrine was the same as 
that of the Wage fund theory previously described: value must be 
measured by that which has been previously invested.  As Charles Francis 
Adams noted in one of his many rhetorical exposes of the railroad watered 
stock scandals of the 1860's: 
 
 It is an elementary principle of political economy, that all wealth 
comes from the soil; neither human industry nor human ingenuity 
can produce any addition to the material possessions of mankind 
except from the earth. 
 
As a result, "The sum total . . . of the wealth of any community and of 
the whole world consists of all that which it has extracted from the earth 
enriched by any value that may have been added to it."36 
 
 Beginning with this classical and backward-looking premise about 
the nature of value, Adams attacked the increasingly popular railroad 
practice of paying stock dividends, which increased the stated par value of 
total outstanding shares without actually increasing the amount of capital 
that had been invested in the company.37  Through the stock dividend, the 
                                                 
33.  Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason 308, 30 Fed. Cas. 435 (1824).  See also 
Sawyer v. Hoag, 84 U.S. (17 Wall.) 610 (1873) (adopting trust fund doctrine). 
34.  These included New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan, as well as 
others.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, "The Classical Corporation in American Legal 
Thought," 76 Geo. L. J. 1593, 1655 (1988). 
35.  1848 N.Y. Laws, ch. 40.  See Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __, Ch. 5.  
See also Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the American Business Corporation, 
1784-1855 at 192 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, "Santa Clara Revisited: the 
Development of Corporate Theory," 88 W. Va. L. Rev. 173, 208 (1985). 
36.  Adams, Railroad Inflation, supra note __ at 130-131. 
37.  Id. at 138-139.  Actually, even under classical theory stock dividends 
watered the stock only if they were in excess of additional capital that the 
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stated capital of the company increased by the par value of the additional 
shares.  Adams then praised the recently enacted Illinois Constitution for 
writing a special provision prohibiting railroads from issuing stock except for 
"money, labor or property actually received."38 
 
 At the turn of the century most states had either statutes or 
constitutional provisions prohibiting shares from being distributed to 
shareholders unless the full stated par value of each share had been paid 
into the corporation.39  As William Cook noted, the problem of stock 
watering was made acute by the law of corporate limited liability, which he 
staunchly defended.40  Limited liability generally entailed that creditors 
could not look to the personal assets of shareholders in the event that 
corporate debtors defaulted and had insufficient resources to pay their 
debts.  Cook noted that modern limited liability had permitted the modern 
securities market to come into existence.  Without it, "the public would not 
dare to buy stocks, because they would be liable for corporate debts."  As a 
result of limited liability "we find in some American corporations over 
100,000 stockholders -- total strangers to each other, and scattered all over 
the world."  Indeed, as Cook acknowledged, this very fact had permitted 
the "vast aggregations of capital which have revolutionized modern 
industry."41 
 
 One result of limited liability, however, was that creditors could turn 
only to the corporation in the event of default.  They had to rely on the 
value of the corporation itself, rather than its human shareholders, in 
determining creditworthiness.  Further, the value of the corporation was 
seen as nothing other than "the money actually paid for the stock."42  Cook 
strongly supported the state blue sky laws, which prevented corporate 
promoters from selling stock that represented no value except the blue sky.  
The statues required a state agency to approve stock issues before they 
                                                                                                                            
corporation accumulated and designated for that purpose. 
38.  Ill. Const., Art. XI, '13 (1869).  See Adams, The Government and the 
Railroad Corporations, 112 N.Am.Rev. 31, 52 (1871). 
39.  See Seymour D. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations 
'3903 (1895) [3d ed. '3918, 1927). 
40.  On the development of limited liability in American corporate law, see H. 
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at ch. 5. 
41.  Cook, "Watered Stock" -- Commissions -- "Blue Sky Laws" -- Stock 
Without Par Value, 19 Mich. L. Rev. 583, 584 (1921). 
42.  Id. 
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could be marketed.43 
 
 No state corporation law found stock to be watered merely because 
the capital originally paid in had subsequently become worthless.44  The 
decisive number was the value of the property at the time it had been paid 
in.  Under the "trust fund" approach to limited shareholder liability,45 the 
stated amount of capital was a fund upon which creditors were entitled to 
rely.  If the fund as originally paid in was smaller than stated, creditors 
could rely on the personal assets of shareholders to make up the 
difference.46  However, the doctrine was subject to one important 
exception, which suggested an understanding that value and paid in capital 
                                                 
43.  Id. at 591. 
44.  E.g., Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 346-347 (1886).  See 
also 2 John C. Bonbright, The Valuation of Property 799 (1937).  
45.  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
46.  See, e.g., Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 114 (1892) (settlement of 
claims as between corporation and its shareholders did not preclude creditors from 
seeking to attach the shareholders' assets); Handley v. Stutz, 139 U.S. 417 (1891) 
(construing Kentucky provision that made incorporating stockholders personally 
liable for the value of unpaid installments: 
 
 The stock of a corporation is supposed to stand in the place of actual 
property of substantial value, and as being a convenient method of 
representing the interest of each stockholder in such property, and to the 
extent to which it fails to represent such value it is either a deception and 
fraud upon the public, or an evidence that the original value of the 
corporate property has become depreciated. The market value of such 
shares rises with an increase in the value of the corporate assets, and falls 
in case of loss or misfortune, whereby the value of such assets is 
impaired; and the increase of value of such stock is taken to represent 
either an appreciation in value of the company's property beyond the par 
value of the original shares, or so much money paid to the corporation as 
is represented by such shares. If it be once admitted that a corporation 
may issue stock without receiving a consideration therefor, and where it 
does not represent actual or substituted value in corporate assets, there is 
apparently no limit to the extent to which the original stock may be 
`watered,' except the caprice of the stockholders. While an agreement that 
the subscribers or holders of stock shall never be called upon to pay for 
the same may be good as against the corporation itself, it has been 
uniformly held by this court not to be binding upon its creditors. 
 
See H. Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at 49-55. 
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were not precisely the same: creditors were entitled to make independent 
judgments of corporate value and would be held to the consequences.  
Thus, for example, if a creditor knew that the capital had not been fully paid 
in but loaned money anyway, he implicitly had valued the corporation by 
some other means than its actual paid in capital.  He could not then go 
after the personal assets of shareholders in the event of the corporation's 
insolvency.47 
 
The Marginalist Revolution 
 
 The term "watered" stock is quaint and largely obsolete today.  
Most shares are issued with no stated par value, or perhaps a very small 
nominal par value such as $1 per share.  While exaggerated valuations are 
still a problem, they are rarely tied to the value of what was paid in when a 
corporation was first formed, except in the case of very young corporations 
or those that have not yet started doing business.  Rather, the 
exaggerations come from material misstatements about the firm's 
prospects, including assets, liabilities, as well as changes in markets that 
could materially affect a firm's future earnings. 
 
 As a matter of actual incentives, prospective shareholders have 
undoubtedly always made investment decisions based on their 
expectations about future earnings, and prospective creditors have 
certainly made similar calculations with respect to loans, particularly if they 
are unsecured.  The problem was that classical political economy and 
classical finance theory did not account for these forward looking elements 
of human behavior.  Indeed, the classical theory of value lacked any 
significant behavioral element whatsoever.  For example, one also 
supposes that an employer in the early nineteenth century who knew 
nothing of theoretical economics made the decision to hire an additional 
worker in just the way that employers do today; namely, by considering 
how much added value the employer could be expected to produce in 
relation to costs.  But the wage-fund doctrine48 entirely ignored such 
subjective, forward looking elements of valuation. 
 
 Marginalism actually entered Anglo-American thought as a 
philosophical theory.  The first marginalists were utilitarians concerned with 
the problem of how individuals and groups maximize their utility, or 
                                                 
47.  Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 347 (1886) ("The plaintiff 
had placed no reliance upon the supposed paid-up capital of the company on the 
increased shares, and therefore has no cause of complaint by reason of their 
subsequent recall."). 
48.  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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happiness.  John Stuart Mill, one of the first great English utilitarians and 
also a political economist, developed a purely hedonistic theory of human 
value in which pleasure and the absence of pain were the only measures of 
happiness, and Mill tied utilitarianism to purely individual preferences.49  
This association of "value" with "preference" was in fact a sharp break with 
the classical theory of value and signalled the beginning of the end for 
classical political economy.  Nevertheless, Mill himself remained quite 
hostile toward marginalism in economic analysis.50  Late in his life, 
however, when confronted with the glaring inconsistencies between the 
marginalism in his philosophical thought and his continued adherence to 
the wage-fund doctrine he completely repudiated the doctrine.51 
 
 Hints of marginalism in economic analysis stretch back to the 
beginning of the nineteenth century and even a little earlier.52  The one 
British writer whose work clearly presaged marginalist economics was 
Jeremy Bentham, whose work on utility theory included a concept of 
declining, or marginal utility, in the 1790s.  The notions of declining 
marginal utility of income and the value of marginal deterrence in criminal 
                                                 
49.  John Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (1863); id., Ch. 2: 
 
 If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what 
makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, 
except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of 
two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have 
experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of 
moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of 
the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so 
far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be 
attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for 
any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are 
justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so 
far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account. 
50.  See Jeff Lipkes, Religion and the Reception of Marginalism in Britain, 26 
Forum for Social Economics 21 (2007); N.B. de Marchi, Mill and Cairnes and the 
Emergence of Marginalism in England, 4(2) Hist.Pol.Econ. 344 (1972). 
51.  See Mill, "Book Review," note ___; and Ekelund, note __.  Mill died four 
years later. 
52.  One prominent example on the Continent is Augustin Cournot, whose 
Researches into the Mathematical Principles of the Theory of Wealth was 
published in French in 1838 and contained well developed theories of marginal 
cost, marginal revenue and even monopoly profit maximization. 
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law were both developed in Bentham's Principles and his Theory of 
Legislation.53  However, Bentham did not carry his observations over into 
formal economics and never developed theories of marginal cost or 
theories of economic value based on marginalism. 
 
 Marginalism emerged as a central tool of economic analysis in the 
early 1870's.  Englishman William Stanley Jevons and Austrian Carl 
Menger, working separately, published books that sought to combine 
philosophical marginal utility theory with classical economics.  Jevons' 
Theory of Political Economy (1871)54 disputed the notion that was nearly 
sacred to the classicists that value depended on the amount of labor that 
had gone into something.  Rather, "value depends entirely on utility," which 
was a purely subjective notion and could be totally unrelated to the amount 
of previous investment.55  "[W]e have only to trace out carefully the natural 
laws of the variation of utility, as depending upon the quantities in our 
possession, in order to arrive at a satisfactory theory of exchange," Jevons 
concluded.  His Theory developed the economic notion of diminishing 
marginal utility -- the more of something a person already has, the less she 
will be willing to pay for an additional unit.  From this Jevons also 
developed the conception of equation of utilities -- that a person applying 
his money to numerous commodities will purchase an amount of each up 
to the point that he derives the same marginal utility from all.56 
 
 Carl Menger's Principles of Economics (1871)57 was less influential 
in the United States than Jevons' work, since Menger stood outside the 
British classical tradition.  However, a large group of American graduate 
                                                 
53.  J. Bentham, An Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 
[1789] (J.H. Burns & H.L.A. Hart eds 1970); Bentham, The Theory of Legislation 
[posthumous] (R. Hildreth transl. 1864). 
54.  A.S. Jevons, The Theory of Political Economy (1871; 3d ed. 1888).  Alfred 
Marshall also deserves part of the credit.  See 1 The Early Economic writings of 
Alfred Marshall 2 (J.K. Whitaker, ed. 1975).  For a thoughtful perspective on the 
rise of marginalism, see D.E. Moggridge, Maynard Keynes: An Economist's 
Biography 84-86 (1992).  John Bates Clark in the United States probably came to 
his marginalism independently.  See J. Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth, chs. 4-5 
(1886); J. Schumpeter, History of Economic Analysis 870 (1954). 
55.  Id. 3d ed. at 1. 
56.  "[W]hen the person remains satisfied with the distribution he has made, it 
follows that .. . an increment of commodity would yield exactly as much utility in 
one use as in another . . . . Id., 3d ed. at 59-60. 
57.  Carl Menger, Principles of Economics (1871). 
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students in political economy who went abroad for graduate study in the 
late nineteenth century ended up on the Continent, especially in Germany, 
and many of them studied Menger.58 
 
 The two characteristics of marginalism that made it so different from 
the thought of the classicists were its subjective, behaviorist definition of 
value and its forward rather than backward looking perspective.  The 
classicists had been convinced that value must be a function of scarcity 
and the amount of labor that went into something -- two things that could 
be measured objectively.  But the neoclassicists realized that this could 
hardly be the whole story.  As British neoclassicist Lionel Robbins pointed 
out, rotten eggs might be rare and cost just as much to produce as good 
eggs.  But even one rotten egg might be more than anyone wants, and as 
a result they are not particularly valuable.59  The essential ingredient 
missing from classical theory was subjective desire, whose intersection 
with scarcity created value.  This led to Robbins famous behaviorist 
definition of economics as "the science which studies human behavior as a 
relationship between ends and scarce means that have alternative uses."60 
 
 This important behavioral aspect of economics so changed the 
focus of economics so as to make it a social science, rather than a natural 
science as the classicists typically thought of political economy.  Under 
marginalism, the economic theory of value became entirely subjective, 
based on the individual utility function rather than on any criterion that 
could be determined from the desired good itself or the environment in 
which the choice was made.  As a result, marginalism forced a shift in 
economics' methodology from the measure of things or the environment in 
which they were contained, to the measure of human choice and 
preference.  To state it differently, economics' basis of measurement 
                                                 
58.  On the influence of German historicism on Progressive Era economics, 
see Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law & Economics Movement, 42 
Stan.L.Rev. 993, 996-997 (1990).  See also Dorothy Ross, The Origins of 
American Social Science 104-105 (1991); Mary Furner, Advocacy and Objectivity: 
A Crisis in the Professionalization of American Social Science, 1865-1905 at 50-57 
(1975). 
59.  Lionel C. Robbins, An Essay on the Nature and Significance of Economic 
Science 46 (1932). 
60.  Robbins, Essay, p. 16 (emphasis added).  On the intellectual and 
technical history or Robbins' definition, see Roger Backhouse and Steven G. 
Medema, Defining Economics: Robbins's Essay in Theory and Practice (SSRN 
Working Paper Series, March 11, 2007), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=969994. 
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moved from an essentially natural science model to a model based on 
presumed rationality or observed individual behavior.  One no longer 
measured value by looking at the amount of something that was available 
or the historical cost of producing it; rather one needed to measure 
individual willingness to pay. 
 
 The great Cambridge marginalist Alfred Marshall knew that the 
whole notion of subjective preference meant nothing at all unless it could 
be measured behaviorally.  Thus one could meaningfully speak of 
consumer demand only "as represented by the schedule of the prices at 
which he is willing to buy different amounts of" something."61  In the highly 
influential eighth edition of his Principles of Economics, Marshall wrote: 
 
 If then we wish to compare . . . physical gratifications, we must do it 
not directly, but indirectly by the incentives which they afford to 
action.  If the desire to secure either of two pleasures will induce 
people in similar circumstances each to do just an hour's extra 
work, or induce men in the same rank of life and with the same 
means each to pay a shilling for it; we then can say that those 
pleasures are equal for our purposes, because the desires for them 
are equally strong incentives to action for persons under similar 
conditions.62 
 
 The other characteristic of marginalism that made it so important for 
business valuation was its forward rather than backward looking 
perspective.  For the classicist valuation was all about averages, and 
averages were always historical.  Thus the wage-fund doctrine as 
previously described determined the optimal rate of wages by considering 
the surplus left over from the previous production period.63  By contrast, 
neoclassical theory asked "How much will one more laborer contribute to 
profitability," and concluded that any wage up to that amount would offer a 
positive contribution to the entrepreneur.  In price theory, the classical 
conception of cost meant average cost, which looked at past expenditures 
divided by output.  By contrast, "marginal" cost looked at the cost that a 
firm's managers anticipated that the firm would incur in the production of 
one additional unit.  Further, marginal cost rather than average cost drives 
the decision about what price to charge or how much to produce.  Indeed, 
perhaps the greatest single contribution of the marginalist model is that 
economic decision making occurs "at the margin" -- by comparing 
                                                 
61.  A. Marshall, Principles of Economics 158 (1890). 
62.  Alfred Marshall, Principles of Economics 15-16 (8th ed 1920). 
63.  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
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anticipated gains against anticipated costs -- and in this calculation 
previous investment is formally irrelevant.64 
 
 The principal problem faced by classical political economy had 
been to explain why people and firms produce and consume mixtures of 
goods, even though these goods appear to have widely different values.  
The classicists were also hard put to explain value itself.  Why is air cheap, 
even though it is essential for survival?  Why are diamonds expensive, 
even though they are luxuries?  A more technical problem also faced by 
the classical political economists had been identifying what is a "cost," and 
determining what the relationship is between the cost of something and its 
value. 
 
 To illustrate some of the problems and the marginalist solution, 
consider the person whose favorite experience is eating peach ice cream.  
Why doesn't this person purchase and consume tons of peach ice cream 
and nothing else?  After all, he prefers a dollar's worth of peach ice cream 
to a dollar's worth of any other product.  Such questions so vexed the 
classical political economists that they generally resorted to elaborate 
theories of objective value, or "primary" goods; or to such metaphysical 
explanations as that people have a basic nature that requires them to 
consume a particular mixture of goods.  But such explanation paradigms 
were totally unhelpful in explaining the manifold differences one could 
observe in the choices of different individuals.  Classical political economy 
generally settled on a rather ambiguous notion that the "value" of anything 
is a function of its cost.  But once again, that did not explain the fact that 
different people placed widely different values on one unit of a good, even 
though its cost was everywhere the same; further, pre-marginalist 
economics had only the poorest conception of what a "cost" really was, 
since all costs had to be stated as either totals or averages, and neither of 
these seemed to be determinative of profitability or rate of output. 
 
 In the case of the peach ice cream, the marginalist answer was so 
elegant and obvious that it appeared instantly to be the key to almost every 
question about individual and social value.  Even the person who says his 
favorite experience is eating peach ice cream experiences declining 
marginal utility for it.  The value of each further quart of peach ice cream 
declines as he has more.  He will buy peach ice cream until the utility from 
the next unit to be purchased has fallen to a level equal to his marginal 
                                                 
64.  As John Maynard Keynes noted already in his student notes of 1905, 
previously expended labor has no impact on value if value is a function of marginal 
desire, or willingness to pay.  See Robert Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: Hopes 
Betrayed, 1883-1920 at 165 (1983). 
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utility for some other good, such as broccoli.  For example, suppose he 
obtains twenty utils65 of utility from his first quart of peach ice cream.  
Saying that his favorite experience is eating peach ice cream is equivalent 
to saying that the value he places on this first unit of peach ice cream is 
greater than the value he places on the first unit of any other good.  But this 
person will not likely value a second quart of peach ice cream by quite as 
much as the first, and almost certainly will not value the 100th quart by as 
much as the first.  Suppose he obtains twenty utils from the first quart of 
peach ice cream, eighteen utils from the second, sixteen from the third, and 
so on in linear fashion.  By contrast, he obtains five utils from his first 
pound of broccoli, four from the second, and so on. 
 
 The classicists, not having the concept of marginal utility, observed 
only that the subject preferred peach ice cream to broccoli and were hard 
pressed to explain why he purchased any broccoli at all.  But on the above 
numbers the marginalist would draw remarkably precise conclusions.  
Assume that peach ice cream cost $1.00 per quart, broccoli $1.00 per 
pound, and the subject had ten dollars to spend.  He would buy eight 
quarts of ice cream and two pounds of broccoli.  Once he had seven quarts 
of ice cream the marginal utility for the next quart would be four utils.  At 
that point an additional dollar spent on a pound of broccoli would give him 
five utils of utility while another quart of peach ice cream would produce 
only four.  A utility maximizer would buy a pound of broccoli.  Then, with 
two dollars left he would face three options.  He could buy two additional 
quarts of ice cream which would produce four utils for the first and two utils 
for the second, or six.  He could buy two additional pounds of broccoli, 
which would give four utils and three utils, or seven.  Or he could buy one 
of each, which would produce four utils and four utils, or eight.  He would 
buy one of each, giving him a total of eight quarts of peach ice cream and 
two pounds of broccoli. 
 
 Neoclassicism produced several important corollaries from the 
simple statement of marginalism described above.  First, when people 
place value on goods that they are considering, only the marginal value, 
not the total value, is relevant.  Second, people tend to equate utilities over 
their entire set of purchasing decisions.  Presumptively, every person's 
stock of goods is such that her marginal values are all precisely identical.  
To the extent they are not, she corrects the situation the next time she 
purchases by buying whatever has the highest marginal value. 
 
 Third, business firms, whose goal is the maximization of profits, 
also equate marginal utilities, but these are measured as marginal 
expenditures and marginal revenues.  For example, in deciding what inputs 
                                                 
65.  A "util" is an imaginary unit of satisfaction. 
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to use in making a product, the firm maximizes its profits by using each 
input up to a point that its marginal cost is identical to the marginal cost of 
every other input.  If labor and machinery are alternative inputs into a 
product and the current cost of labor is $5 per unit of value produced while 
the current cost of machinery is $4, the firm will invest in more machinery 
and less labor until the two are equalized.  Likewise, in deciding what 
mixtures of products to produce, the firm produces each up to the point that 
the marginal profit from producing more is equalized.  Suppose a firm 
makes widgets and gidgets.  Additional gidgets can be sold at a profit of 
$1.50 while additional widgets can be sold at a profit of $1.00.  The firm will 
make relatively more gidgets and relatively less gidgets.  It will continue 
making this adjustment until the marginal profitability is the same, or until 
the rate of widget production falls to zero, whichever comes first. 
 
 Thus marginalism provided economics with the basis for a general 
theory of consumer demand, a theory of value, a theory about production 
and consumption, and a theory of costs, all of which could be quantified 
with great apparent mathematical precision, although measurement 
problems remained difficult.  Thanks to marginalism, neoclassical 
economics became more coherent and rigorous than classicism had ever 
hoped to be. 
 
The Emergence of Neoclassical Price Theory 
 
 Neoclassical economics developed out of a marginal utility theory 
that based value on forward looking subjective preference rather than 
historical averages of objective investments.  But in the 1920s a divergence 
occurred in neoclassical economics that controls its various subdisciplines 
to this day.  Neoclassical price theory -- or the theory of how firms 
maximize profits -- very largely did away with the study of the actual 
preferences of the business firm and simply assumed that the business 
firm was organized in order to maximize profits.  Even today, in 
neoclassical price theory and industrial organization (the study of firms and 
markets) the subjective intentions of a business firm rarely count for much 
except as a device for explaining otherwise ambiguous behavior. 
 
 For example, when an economist says that in a competitive market 
a firm prices at marginal cost, or that a monopolist equates marginal cost 
and marginal revenue, it is not because she has conducted a survey asking 
firms how they set prices or output.  It is because making decisions in 
these ranges can be shown to maximize profits on the basis of strictly 
objective and formal criteria, such as the amount of market power that the 
firm has and the nature of market demand. 
 
 In contrast, welfare economics deals largely with the preferences of 
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biological individuals, who have much more complex motives than 
maximization of profits or wealth.  In order to study consumer behavior, for 
example, one must to a considerable extent rely on revealed preference.66  
In sum, welfare economics rested on "behaviorist" concepts while the 
economic theory of the firm largely rested on an assumption of profit-
maximization. 
 
 Because modern corporate finance is a mixture of economic theory 
and economic policy it has never insisted quite so stridently that firm 
behavior must be evaluated without regard to subjective intent.  Further, a 
great deal of improper behavior by firms may also not be profit maximizing, 
in the sense that it maximizes the value of the firm as a whole.  Rather, it 
may simply transfer wealth from shareholders or employees to managers, 
and often reduces corporate profits in the process.  Nevertheless, the 
neoclassical theory of corporate finance very largely treats the modern 
corporation as a unitary profit-maximizing entity and assesses its behavior 
on that basis.  Under the formal theory the separate identity of both 
shareholders and managers is irrelevant. 
 
Marginalism and Corporate Value 
 
 In sharp contrast to classicism's focus on previously invested capital 
and stated par value, neoclassicists viewed the value of a corporation as its 
ability to earn profits in the future.  This was in turn a function of the degree 
by which anticipated revenues would exceed anticipated costs.67  Indeed, 
as many neoclassicists would point out, the amount of previous investment 
often had very little to do with value.  Some corporations which had 
invested little but found just the right niche were worth many times more 
than paid in capital.  Others, which had expended giant sums on research 
that had gone nowhere, might be worth only a tiny fraction.  To be sure, the 
classicists had known these facts for almost a century, but had been 
unable to develop a theory of value that would account for them. 
                                                 
66.  On this all important distinction between the concept of value in price 
theory as opposed to emergent welfare economics see University of Chicago 
economist Jacob Viner's harsh critique.  Jacob Viner, The Utility Concept in Value 
Theory and Its Critics. II. The Utility Concept in Welfare Economics, 33 J. Pol. 
Econ. 638, 657 (1925), accusing welfare economists of importing the objective 
concepts of price theory into their analysis in order to avoid the harder job of 
empirical testing of actual human preferences.   "[M]uch of what passes for utility 
theory is really objective price-theory presented in the purloined terminology of 
subjective analysis...."  And see Herbert Hovenkamp, The Limits of Preference-
Based Legal Policy, 89 Nw.U.L.Rev. 4, 81-82 (1994). 
67.  One of the better statements of this position among financial economists is 
William Lough, Business Finance, Ch. 8 (1917).   
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 The marginalist revolution had several implications for corporate 
law.  First, the entire concept of "par value," with par measured as a 
function of previous investment, was of little worth in measuring the value 
of a corporation.  If the concept of "par value" was to prove useful at all, it 
must be based on the current value of the corporation's assets, with assets 
generally measured by their value to the corporation itself -- that is, their 
capacity to produce a profit, or their exchange value in a sale.  So George 
Kennan argued in 1916 that it was perfectly legitimate for the Chicago and 
Alton Railroad to reorganize in 1899 and greatly increase its capitalization, 
even though no additional capital had been paid in to the corporation.  The 
new value simply represented the railroad's increased prospects to earn a 
profit.68  Opponents writing in the economics journals generally 
acknowledged that in theory anticipated ability to earn a profit was a 
superior measure of value than historically invested capital; they 
complained merely that while invested capital was easily measurable, 
determining ability to earn a profit was a purely speculative exercise.69 
 
 In 1909 a group of corporate attorneys led by Francis Lynde 
Stetson convinced the New York Bar Association to back a proposal to 
amend the state's corporation law to permit shares to be issued "without 
the dollar mark" -- that is, without a stated par value.70  In 1912 New York 
became the first state to pass a statute permitting corporations to issue 
shares having no-par, or merely nominal par, value.  The statute required 
the company to state what its working capital was, but permitted the 
company to state the value of this capital in terms of current market value, 
which of course reflected the business prospects of the firm.71  During the 
1910's most states passed similar statutes.  By 1927 nearly forty states had 
amended their corporation statutes to permit no-par shares,72 and by 1947 
every state except Nebraska and Kentucky had done so.73  As the new 
                                                 
68.  George Kennan, The Chicago & Alton Case: A Misunderstood Transaction  
28-34 (1916). 
69.  James Bonbright, No-Par Stock: its Economics and Legal Aspect, 38 
Q.J.Econ. 440 (1924); James Bonbright, Earning Power as a Basis of Corporate 
Capitalization, 35 Q.J.Econ. 482 (1921). 
70.  William Z. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 46 (1927). 
71.  Act of April 15, 1912, ''19-23 of the Stock Corporation Law.  See also 
Parker, Corporation Manual '8 (1930). 
72.  See 5 Seymour Thompson, supra note ___ at '3627. 
73.  See Carlos L. Israels, Problems of Par and No-Par Shares: A Reappraisal, 
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statutes developed, they generally permitted the shareholders or directors 
to declare the capital of the corporation, making changes periodically.74 
 
The Twilight of Classical Valuation Theory 
 
 The most general and important implication of marginalism for legal 
thought was its destruction of the concept that law can be either "private" or 
self-executing.  As originally conceived, deterrence based legal theories 
may have been based on some conception of the person of average 
sensibility, temperament, or carefulness.  But the conception quickly gave 
way to the notion that the "average" person was nothing more than the 
state's reification of a standard that its decision makers wished to impose.  
Ultimately, the standard was normative and objective. 
 
 Just as important, neoclassicism's forward looking standards of 
value greatly contributed to the uncertainty and open-endedness of legal 
policy making.  Contracts were no longer thought of as bargains made in 
the past, but as the creation of ongoing relationships in need of regulation.  
The transition to no-par corporate shares meant that corporate 
creditworthiness could no longer be viewed as the result of a precisely 
measurable transaction completed in the past. 
 
 Looking forward necessarily implied greater uncertainty than 
looking back, and uncertainty seemed to increase the opportunity for abuse 
and error.  These two factors -- that standards were publicly rather than 
privately created, and that forward-looking policies needed to be managed 
in ways that backward ones did not -- account for the rise of the regulatory 
state during the New Deal. 
 
 Many Progressives viewed the rise of no-par stock with 
considerable suspicion, generally concluding that it represented nothing 
more than legislative capture by corporate entrepreneurs.  Berle and 
Means objected that the rise of no-par shares created yet another 
opportunity for corporate managers and majority shareholders to abuse 
minority shareholders.  The movement toward no-par shares gave directors 
the power to "dilute at will" the value of outstanding shares.75  And they had 
                                                                                                                            
47 Col.L.Rev. 1279 (1947). 
74.  As Berle and Means noted in 1932, virtually all statutes by that time 
permitted the Board of Directors to declare the capital.  Adolf A. Berle and 
Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 159 (1932). 
75.  Berle and Means, supra note __ at 159.  Berle had expressed similar 
opinions a few years earlier.  See Adolf August berle, Studies in the Law of 
Corporation Finance 64 (1928) ("Probably the greatest single step in transferring 
control of property rights from stockholders to corporate managements was taken 
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a point.  One problem with the marginalist mechanism of establishing value 
was that it was so imprecise and susceptible of manipulation. 
 
 Further, this separation of "value" from paid-in capital was just more 
evidence that the link between ownership and control of the corporation 
was all but gone.  Berle and Means wrote: 
 
 What is a share of stock "worth." . . .  Curious as it may seem, the 
fact appears to be that liquid property, at least under the corporate 
system, obtains a set of values in exchange, represented by market 
prices, which are not immediately dependent upon . . . the 
underlying values of the properties themselves.  Two forms of 
property appear, one above the other, related but not the same.  At 
the bottom is the physical property itself, still immobile. . . .  Related 
to this is a set of tokens, passing from hand to hand. . . , which 
attain an actual value in exchange or market price only in part 
dependent upon the underlying property. Into it enter elements 
which are not normally admitted to be elements in the value of the 
latter.  The tokens may, for instance, represent in their value an 
appraisal of the supposed ability of the particular management 
interposed between the properties and the owners.76 
 
 Thus under no-par stock the value of a corporation -- previously 
accessible to anyone who knew stated par and the number of shares of 
each class outstanding -- became a mystery known only to the managers.  
Minority shareholders acted largely in ignorance.  These observations 
tended to exacerbate the view held by many marginalist liberals, such as 
John Maynard Keynes, that the stock market had become little more than a 
"casino" in which equity traders gambled, paying prices that had little to do 
with a corporation's worth.  Only after considerable marginalist theorizing 
did this view give way to the modern belief that capital markets are efficient 
and share prices generally reflect a company's intrinsic worth.77 
 
 In any event, the need for complete, ongoing disclosure to 
prospective shareholders loomed much larger under the marginalist theory 
of value, since it looked to current capacity to earn a profit rather than 
historical investment.  As late as the 1860's stock certificates had been 
looked at as almost a firm of "currency," in which the par value stated on 
                                                                                                                            
when the institution of non-par-stock was adopted into American corporation law."). 
76.  Id. at 285-286. 
77.  See discussion infra, text at notes __. 
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the certificate was presumptive evidence of the value of the corporation.  
Indeed, even in 1924, after no-part stock had become well established, 
Cornelius Wickersham complained that "gullible" purchasers continued to 
believe that the stated par value on a stock certificate somehow 
represented the value of the shares.78  Rather, a certificate stating "that the 
holder is entitled to the share in the assets thereby represented (whatever 
those assets may be) is a more accurate statement of his rights as a 
stockholder of the corporation than one designating a par value."79 
 
 Thus by the time of the Blue Sky laws and a little later the federal 
Securities Acts, the perceived problem was not exaggeration of paid in 
capital, but rather "balance sheet inflation."  Section 11 of the federal 
statute created liability in the directors for knowingly making false 
statements concerning the value of virtually any element of corporate 
assets, and gave a lawsuit to anyone who purchased shares in reliance on 
such statements.80 
 
 The great corporate scandals of the Gilded Age produced an anti-
business corporation rhetoric that remains with us today.  Certainly there is 
more than a kernel of truth in the corporate scandal stories, but much of the 
reality is that the Progressive Era muckraking reflected a theory of 
corporate finance that was in the process of collapsing as corporate 
finance theory and the legal system shifted toward a more neoclassical 
methodology of corporate valuation.  Part of the story is also driven by the 
historical happenstance that the increase in corporate value during the late 
nineteenth century was unprecedented, making historical investment a 
particularly bad surrogate for corporate evaluation.  Quite simply, corporate 
managers looking forward at earnings prospects might see a number many 
times larger than historical invested capital.81 
 
 Nevertheless, the resiliency of the classical theory of corporate 
valuation was very strong, and it lasted much longer than the wage fund 
                                                 
78.  Cornelius Wickersham, The Progress of the Law on No Par Value Stock, 
37 Harv. L.Rev. 464, 464 (1924).  See also Cornelius W. Wickersham, A Treatise 
on Stock Without Par Value of Ordinary Business Corporations (1927). 
79.  Ibid. 
80.  See In re Haddam Distillers Corp., 1 S.E.C. 37 (1934); In re Thomas 
Bond, Inc., 5 S.E.C. 60 (1939). 
81.  On Corporate growth during the period see Sean Dennis Cashman, 
America in the Gilded Age 1-40 (3d ed. 1993).  See generally Alfred D. Chandler, 
The Visible Hand: The Managerial Revolution in American Business (1977) (rise of 
large vertically integrated corporation during this period). 
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doctrine.82  Even Progressive liberal economists who found the marginalist 
revolution quite useful in other area were skeptical about no-par stock.  A 
good example is Progressive railroad economist William Z. Ripley of 
Harvard's economics department.  Although Ripley was too much a 
marginalist to believe that "value" ought to be based on historically invested 
capital rather than anticipated profitability, he nonetheless believed that the 
no-par share statutes would prove to be the breeding ground of "fraud and 
deception."83  This theme would be repeated among Progressives, whether 
marginalist or not: whatever one might think of the process of removing par 
value as a basis for corporate valuation, doing so entailed considerably 
more managerial speculation, making some form of regulation in order. 
 
 Nineteenth century courts rejected out of hand the marginalist 
argument that the true value of a corporation was its earnings potential.  
Under this rejected argument a stock should not be considered "watered" 
merely because the stated par value was less than the amount paid in.  
Rather, the relevant number should be the present value of future earnings.  
As the Supreme Court concluded in 1891, in determining whether sufficient 
capital had been paid in, it would not look at intangibles reflecting on the 
earning power of the corporation, for these were "too unsubstantial and 
shadowy" to provide an estimate of value.  The Court conceded "that the 
goodwill of a business may be the subject of barter and sale as between 
the parties to it. . . ."  But in cases involving corporate default and a creditor 
allegation of watered stock, they provided no basis for determining value.84  
A 1905 New Jersey court -- one of the courts that was most solicitous of 
corporate managers -- concluded that corporate promoters were not 
entitled to declare the value of paid in property by estimating future 
corporate profits. . . .85  The court rejected the view that it was "competent 
and lawful to make up the valuation of the visible property to be purchased 
for stock issued, by adding . . . a sum of money ascertained by the 
capitalization of the annual profits expected to be realized from a favorable 
                                                 
82.  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
83.  W. Ripley, Main Street and Wall Street 49 (1927). 
84.  Camden v. Stuart, 144 U.S. 104, 115 (1892). 
85.  See v. Heppenheimer, 69 N.J.Eq. 36, 61 A. 843 (1905) (rejecting 
evaluation that depended in part on anticipated suppression of the firm's 
competitors and anticipated price increase of the product from $20 to $28 per ton; 
court states that paid-in property used for evaluation must be something "visible 
and tangible."  69 N.J. Eq. at 53, 61 A. at 850. 
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marketing of the product."86  Most nineteenth century courts enforced this 
rule simply by asking juries whether the money and property paid into the 
corporation had a value at the time it was paid in that equaled or exceeded 
the stated par value of the shares.  This rule, generally known as the "true 
value" rule, ignored estimates of value made by the incorporators 
themselves, even if these had been made in good faith.87  The "only 
question for the jury is, was the property worth the amount of the stock."88 
 
 But even as these courts were stating the orthodox view, others 
were developing rationalizations that changed corporate valuation from a 
classical to a neoclassical exercise.  Already in 1886 the Supreme Court 
had adopted a standard for the federal courts which deferred to the 
incorporators' good faith estimates of the value of their corporation.89  If the 
estimate was made in good faith, then the corporation would not 
subsequently be found undercapitalized simply because the value of paid 
in property turned out to be inadequate to cover the corporation's debts.  
This good faith test became relevant when paid in capital included real or 
personal property instead of or in addition to cash.  The inevitable 
consequence of the good faith rule was that the value of the capital "paid 
in" began to reflect estimates of anticipated profitability, for such estimates 
guided even "good faith" judgments about the value of non-cash property. 
 
 In approving of the no-par statutes, Victor Morawetz, one of the 
most distinguished corporation scholars in the United States, 
acknowledged that a business corporation must have a capital that cannot 
be impaired by the declaration of stock dividends.  However, "it is not 
necessary that the amount of capital should be fixed by reference to the 
nominal or par amount of the shares issued by the corporation, and it is not 
necessary that the shares should purport to represent specified sums of 
money contributed to the capital."90  Then Morawetz noted the emergent 
view that in most cases the amount of capital paid in bore little relationship 
to the value or creditworthiness of the corporation:91 
                                                 
86.  Id. at 848. 
87.  See Van Cleve v. Berkey, 143 Mo. 109, 44 S.W. 743 (1898); and see 
Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 F. 577, 582 (3d Cir. 1919), which 
discussed the rule and ultimately rejected it. 
88.  Clinton, 256 F. at 579. 
89.  Coit v. North Carolina Gold Co., 119 U.S. 343, 347 (1886). 
90.  Victor Morawetz, Shares Without Nominal or Par Value, 26 Harv.L.Rev. 
729 (1913). 
91.  One exception was banks and similar corporations "whose business is to 
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 In most cases, the capital, or a large part of the capital, or a 
corporation is invested permanently in fixed plant or machinery 
which cannot again be converted into cash, and whose value, in 
great measure depends upon the profitableness of the company's 
business."92 
 
 A potential creditor or purchaser of shares was probably less 
interested in the amount of capital that had been paid into the business 
than in the business' potential to earn a profit.  By the late 1910s a few 
courts began to hold that the proper measure of the value of property was 
the going concern value of the property to the corporation rather than its 
historical value.93  As a consequence, the "trust fund" doctrine gradually 
disappeared.94  James Bonbright, one of the 1930's best known scholars of 
corporate finance, concluded that the emerging definition of corporate 
value was far more realistic than the classical definition because, as far as 
creditors are concerned, the relevant values are "going concern" values.  
Normally, "the amount of `invested capital' in which he is supposedly 
interested is the amount of profit-making power which the assets may 
confer upon the company."95 
 
 In his influential treatise on corporate finance, Arthur Stone Dewing 
distinguished between economic, accounting and legal conceptions of 
corporate capital.  Importantly, both the legal conception and the 
accounting conception relied heavily on the stated values of amounts that 
had previously been paid in.  By contrast, businessmen and investors were 
interested mainly in the economic meaning of capital, which had to do with 
productive value.  A corporation might have a patent for which it paid little 
                                                                                                                            
deal in money, credits, and securities, and whose assets are kept in liquid form."  
Id. at 729. 
92.  Ibid. 
93.  For example, Clinton Mining & Mineral Co. v. Jamison, 256 F. 577, 582 
(3d Cir. 1919), which permitted valuation to be based even on the probability that a 
mining corporation would discover additional ore not yet discovered on the date of 
the claim. 
94.   See 5 S & T. Thompson, Commentaries on the Law of Corporations 
'3425 at 260 (3d ed. 1927), who concluded that the trust fund doctrine was "not 
only monstrous but in practicable application would be ruinous to the business 
management of corporations." 
95.  2 Bonbright, supra note __ at 801. 
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or nothing, noted Dewing, but was nevertheless of great value.96  Rather 
than looking at a corporation's creditworthiness, or "capital," as that which 
had been paid in, it should be viewed as representing "anything of concrete 
and specific value, material or intangible, which affords definite help in 
enabling the corporation to conduct its business at a profit."97  Dewing went 
on to note that, although this conception of capital was the important one, it 
was easily subject to abuse because the corporation could more easily 
exaggerate its earnings potential than it could the cash value of specific 
cash or property that had been paid in in the past. 
 
 In defending the rise of no-par shares, Dewing noted simply that 
"the right to participate in earning is the fundamental characteristic of stock 
-- not its right to participate in the property. . . ."  As a result, no-par shares 
were designed to "record the proportional rights of their holders in the 
earnings of the corporation and ignore the amount of the contribution on 
which their rights were based."98 
 
 Under the classical theory, par value was "the actual and 
substantial stake contributed by the owners of the business, and on the 
strength of this stake they are justified in asking for and receiving credit."99  
But the problem with this theory was that paid in capital had absolutely 
nothing to do with the value or creditworthiness of the corporation as a 
going concern. 
 
 [A]s soon as the new corporation begins business operations, 
whatever correspondence between the value of its property and the 
nominal or money value of its capital stock that may have existed in 
the beginning, is lost immediately.  Some of these operations result 
in a profit, in which case the corporate property is increased while 
the amount of outstanding capital stock remains the same; some 
operations result in a loss, and a discrepancy between the property 
and the par value of the capital stock arises in the opposite 
direction.  The important thing to observe is that the equality 
between property and capital stock, however justified at the 
beginning, is upset by the very operations for which the corporation 
was organized."100 
                                                 
96.  1 A.S. dewing, The Financial Policy of Corporations 55 (4th ed. 1941) (first 
edition, 1919). 
97.  Id. at 56. 
98.  Id. at 68. 
99.  Dewing, supra note __ at 71. 
100.  Id. at 73-74. 
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 Dewing was more sanguine than Progressive economists about the 
potential for abuse.  In his view no-par shares would serve to increase the 
participation of investors in corporate affairs.  Having removed previously 
invested capital as a basis for estimating value, the prospective 
shareholder or lender would be 
 
 forced to investigate the earnings of the corporation, present and 
past, the history of the corporation and its managers, its standing in 
the industry, and the value of its shares with reference to current 
and future interest rates, as they are affected by the rise and fall of 
industrial activity.  These factors and others like them determine 
values, and anything that forces the investor to seek for them tends 
to conserve the social capital by encouraging greater intelligence 
and acumen among investors."101 
 
 How liability should be assessed when corporations with no-par 
stock were found to be undercapitalized was initially a difficult problem for 
the courts, and they faced the new method of valuation with considerable 
confusion.  In Norton v. Lamb (1936) the Kansas Supreme Court simply 
held that subscribers who had not actually paid even the $1 nominal par 
value stated on the share certificates could be held liable for that sum.102 
 
 Other decisions served to realize the worst fears of the Progressive 
critics.  Courts held that no-par shares effectively meant that creditors were 
without a remedy provided that the nominal par, if stated, had been paid 
and the corporation met any minimum capitalization requirement assessed 
by state law.  For example, in G. Loewus & Co. v. Highland Queen Packing 
Co. (1939), the incorporators had transferred property worth $1500 to the 
corporation but carried this on their books as capital worth $6000.  Under 
New Jersey law the requirements for issuance of no-par shares had been 
met and the statute held that such shares "shall be deemed fully paid and 
non-assessable, and the holder of such shares shall not be liable to the 
corporation or its creditors in respect thereof."103  This denied the creditors 
any remedy.  Likewise, the Sixth Circuit held that the regime created by no-
                                                 
101.  Dewing, supra note __  at 75.  Compare R. H. Hollen & R.S. Tuthill, Uses 
of Stock Having no Par Value, 7 A.B.A.J. 579 (1921) (no par stock forces the 
investor to look at the corporation's current value before making an investment 
decision, rather than focusing on that which was historically paid in.). 
102.  Norton v. Lamb, 144 Kan. 665, 62 P.2d 1311 (1936). 
103.  N.J. Rev. Stat. '14:8-6 (1937). 
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par statutes was essentially "let the creditor beware. . . ."104 
 
 As Dodd and Baker had pointed out in their widely used casebook 
on corporate law, the issuance of no-par shares did not absolve the 
corporation of an obligation to state its value to potential creditors.  Rather, 
it shifted the focus away from the historical value of capital at the time the 
shares had been issued to the current value that the corporation stated in 
its accounting books.  Speaking of the problem of "watering" of no-par 
shares, they said: 
 
 Even where the transaction or acquisition is one of mere barter of 
no-par shares for property or services, a valuation of the latter is a 
practical necessity from the mere fact that corporations are 
expressly or impliedly required to keep books of account, and as yet 
there is no known way of keeping books in other than monetary 
terms.  So if Blackacre is acquired through the issue of no-par 
shares, it is necessary to apply to Blackacre some figure in dollars 
at which to enter it on the books as a debit to an asset account. . . 
.105 
 
 In 1947 Carlos Israels noted that a corporation could avoid all stock 
watering liability by simply stating its capital conservatively -- no greater 
than a price at which contributed property could readily be sold -- and then 
add any additional evaluation as paid in surplus.  Such a company was not 
undercapitalized, and creditors could make anything they wished of the 
paid-in surplus figure.  In all events, the value of the shares was driven not 
by the amount that had been paid in: 
 
 The investing public has been "educated" to the point where it is 
now quite willing to pay much more than par for a par value share, 
and where it is very little concerned with book value, or with the 
proportion of the price of no-par shares proposed to be credited to 
capital.  Earnings or earnings possibilities appears to dominate 
investor thinking as to price.106 
 
 By 1940 economists were taking a much more explicitly marginalist 
look at the problem.  For example, in the second edition of their book on 
public control of corporations, Charles Tippets and Shaw Livermore noted 
                                                 
104.  Johnson v. Louisville Trust, 293 F. 857 (C.C.A.6th 1923). 
105.  E. Merrick Dodd & Ralph J. Baker, Cases and Materials on Business 
Associations 1004 (1940). 
106.  Israels, supra note __, 47 Col. L.Rev. at 1292-1293. 
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that the problem of watered stock had been attended by "much loose 
thinking and writing."  First of all, true value was virtually impossible to 
determine, and there were several methods of going about it: 
 
 If physical appraisal by engineers is meant, then earning rates 
could be matched against a definite figure and a proper amount of 
securities obtained  But even slight acquaintance with the 
conditions of competitive industry teaches that there is no typical 
relationship between value of physical assets and earning power.  It 
may be very different for a chewing gum concern and a steel 
plant.107 
 
Tippetts and Livermore identified stock as watered simply when its 
declared value "was larger than a reasonable capitalization rate applied to 
the earnings" would warrant. 
 
The Neoclassical Corporation: 
From Institutionalism to the Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Marginalism's Critics: Darwinism and Institutionalism 
 
 Marginalism was only one of the two great scientific revolutions of 
the Victorian Era.  During this period American scientific and moral values 
were overrun at least as much by Darwinism, also of essentially British 
origin.108  These two theories of human behavior were hardly consistent 
with each other.  Nevertheless they worked together in an odd way to make 
behaviorism the key to understanding nearly everything important about 
the human condition. 
 
 American intellectual historians in the fifties and sixties wrote the 
history of the Gilded Age and Progressive Era as if it were entirely a story 
about the various intellectual offshoots of Darwinism.109  Indeed, it is still 
                                                 
107.  Charles S. Tippetts & Shaw Livermore, Business Organizations and 
Public Control 378 (2d ed. 1941). 
108.  Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species by means of natural Selection, 
or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life (1859).  On Darwin's 
influence on late Victorian American intellectuals see Louis Menand, The 
Metaphysical Club: A Story of Ideas in America (2001). 
109.  For example, Robert G. McCloskey, American Conservatism in the Age 
of Enterprise, 1865-1910 at 26-30 (1951); Richard Hofstadter, Social Darwinism in 
American Thought 60-63 and passim (rev. ed. 1959); Sydney Fine, Laissez Faire 
and the General Welfare State 84-85 (1964).  Henry S. Commager, The American 
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fashionable to use Social Darwinism as the paradigm for explaining liberty 
of contract, or the general laissez faire position of the Supreme Court after 
the turn of the century.110 
 
 Nonetheless, one viewing mainstream legal writing during this 
period is struck by the absence of reference to Darwin or to Social 
Darwinist rhetoric.111  Historians have been quite willing to assign a cause 
for the legal revolution of the turn of the century that has only the thinnest 
support in the writings of the legal scholars themselves.  For example, 
Holmes' professional career stretched over more than sixty years, but his 
writing includes a scant half dozen references to Darwin, and even these 
are sufficiently ambiguous that scholars still debate about whether Holmes 
was in fact a Social Darwinist.112  In his well-known Lochner dissent he 
accused the Supreme Court's majority of using the Fourteenth Amendment 
to "enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics,"113 but with no evidence that 
any member of the Court had ever given either Darwin or Spencer a single 
thought. 
                                                                                                                            
Mind 359-373 (1950).  See also Edward S. Corwin, Court Over Constitution (2d ed. 
1950); Bernard Schwartz, The Supreme Court: Constitutional Revolution in 
Retrospect (1957). 
110.  For example, Paul Kens, Judicial Power and Reform Politics: the 
Anatomy of Lochner v. New York 67-68 (1990).  Contrast Herbert Hovenkamp, 
The Political Economy of Substantive Due Process, 40 Stan.L.Rev. 379 (1988).  
For another effort to minimize the role of Social Darwinism, see Michael J. Phillips, 
The Lochner Court, Myth and Reality: Substantive Due Process from the 1890s to 
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111.  For example, see A. Paul, Conservative Crisis and the Rule of Law: 
Attitudes of Bar and Bench, 1887-1895 at 22 & n. 10 ([1960] rep. ed. 1976), who, 
while attributing the rise of laissez faire conservatism among lawyers to Social 
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Social Darwinism. 
112.  On the theory of evolution and Holmes, see Holmes, Law in Science and 
Science in Law, 12 Harv. L. Rev. 443, 449 (1889); Holmes, Primitive Notions in 
Modern Law, 10 Am. L. Rev. 422, 429-30 (1876).  On Holmes's Darwinism, see 
Albert W. Alschuler, Law Without Values: The Life, Work and Legacy of Justice 
Holmes (2000); J.W. Burrow, Holmes in His Intellectual Milieu, 17, 25, in The 
Legacy of Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. (Robert W. Gordon, ed. 1992); Jan Vetter, 
The Evolution of Holmes, Holmes and Evolution, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 343 (1984); E. 
Donald Elliott, Holmes and Evolution: Legal Process as Artificial Intelligence, 13 J. 
Legal Stud. 113 (1984); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in 
Jurisprudence, 64 Tex.L.Rev. 645 (1985). 
113.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905). 
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 The Darwinian approach did show up in Progressive Era economic 
theory, but it was in leftward leaning institutionalism rather than 
marginalism.114  The evolutionary approach to economics reflected in 
institutionalism largely eschewed mathematical theory in favor of detailed 
description and historical development.  In economics these concerns 
eventually became central to the work of such institutionalists as Thorstein 
Veblen, John R. Commons, and Wesley Mitchell, all of whom yearned for a 
more evolutionary approach to economics.  They spent much of their lives 
accounting for the ways in which economic actors departed from presumed 
rational behavior.115 
 
 Marginalists at the turn of the century, when basic models for the 
social sciences were being formed, faced the criticism that marginalism 
was based on a narrow view of humanity that did not take biological 
evolution into account.  Thorstein Veblen criticized marginalist economics 
for not being an "evolutionary" science.116  Marginalist economics stripped 
humanity down to a set of utility functions that equated human behavior 
with desire and completely ignored inherited characteristics.  To be sure, 
the theory of evolution was just as reductionist, recasting desire as nothing 
more than the instinct to survive.  But the two models developed 
fundamentally different, even mutually exclusive, mechanisms for 
determining appropriate social policy.  The differences showed up most 
starkly in theories about controlling deviant behavior and criminality.  
Marginalists would control crime by creating liberty or financial incentives 
that regulated the behavior of human beings as autonomous actors.  By 
contrast, the Darwinians would control criminal behavior by identifying 
those "types" that were thought to be prone to it, and then using 
sterilization or other means to ensure that they could not reproduce their 
kind.  What is often unappreciated today is the extent to which both models 
                                                 
114.  See Geoffrey M. Hodgson, The Evolution of Institutional Economics: 
Agency, Structure, and Darwinism in American Institutionalism (2004).  The classic 
study of the difference between institutional and neoclassical economics is David 
Hamilton, Evolutionary Economics: A Study of Change in Economic Thought 
(1953). 
115.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, The First Great Law and Economics 
Movement, 42 Stan.L.Rev. 993 (1990). 
116.  Veblen, Why is Economics Not an Evolutionary Science, 12 Q.J.Econ. 
384 (1898).  Legal Realist Walton Hamilton echoed the criticisms a generation 
later.  See Walton H. Hamilton, The Institutionalist Approach to Economic Theory, 
9 Am.Econ.Rev. 309 (1919). 
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guided Progressive Era policy making.117 
 
 One important difference between marginalist and Darwinian 
models was the degree of empirical content.  Darwinian investigations were 
heavily empirical and during the post-Civil War and Progressive Era 
produced detailed empirical studies into subjects such as the source of 
criminality, degeneration, social control, and the like.118  In economics, 
institutionalism tended to yield detailed historical studies of particular 
industries or firms.  By contrast, marginalism as a concept was heavily 
driven by mathematics and had no empirical content at all.  Marginalism 
accounted for the behavior of a theoretical "rational" actor or profit-
maximizing firm.  Any questions about the extent to which people or firms 
fail to act rationally were relegated to the fringes of economic science. 
 
 Berle and Means' Modern Corporation and Private Property119 
reflected this evolutionary approach, with its focus on empirical detail and 
its emphasis on the extent to which corporations departed from the norms 
of rational behavior -- such as the famous discussions about inefficiencies 
that result from the separation of ownership and control.  As other 
institutionalist writings, Berle and Means was heavily historical and drawn 
to classical rather than neoclassical theories of value.120 
 
 The contrast could not be bolder.  For Berle and Means the 
corporation was a potentially harmful institution, often acting contrary to the 
public interest but -- even more ominously -- often acting contrary to its own 
best interests because management did not have the owners' interests at 
heart.  In contrast, the marginalist corporation was a unified economic actor 
whose every action was understood in terms of profit maximization.  
                                                 
117.  See, e.g., Mark Haller, Eugenics: Hereditarian Attitudes in American 
Thought (1963, repr. New Brunswick, 1984); Donald Pickens, Eugenics and the 
Progressives (Nashville, 1966). 
118.  See, e.g., Richard Dugdale, The Jukes: A Study in Crime, Pauperism, 
Disease and Heredity (3d ed. 1877).  And See Michael Willrich, The Two Percent 
Solution: Eugenic Jurisprudence and the Socialization of American Law, 1900-
1930, 16 L. & Hist. Rev. 63 (1998); Herbert Hovenkamp, Evolutionary Models in 
Jurisprudence, 64 Tex.L.Rev. 645 (1985); Herbert Hovenkamp, Insanity and 
Criminal Responsibility in Progressive America, 57 N.Dak.L.Rev. 541 (1981).   
119.  Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and 
Private Property (1932).  On the writing of The Modern Corporation, see Thomas 
K. McCraw,In Retrospect: Berle and Means, 18 Reviews in Am.Hist. 578 (1990). 
120.  On institutionalism as an economics movement in the United States, see 
Hovenkamp, First Great Law and Economics Movement, note __, at 1013-1030. 
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Indeed, marginalists tended to cast aside as irrelevant evidence that 
corporations did in fact act in ways that seemed contrary to their own best 
interests. 
 
Neoclassicism and the Separation of Ownership and Control 
 
 Berle and Means' Modern Corporation remains to this day a 
critically important historical artifact in the law of corporations.  It is widely 
cited, although perhaps negatively as often as positively.  Undoubtedly pre-
War Institutionalism's most enduring legacy has been Berle and Means, 
and the "separation of ownership and control" will forever be associated 
with their names, even though the idea originated in Thorstein Veblen's 
Absentee Ownership a decade earlier.121 
 
 In contrast, the more general pre-war institutionalist movement has 
died out and largely been forgotten.  Mainly, the institutionalists were 
excessively empirical, much too concerned with factual detail, and unable 
to devise useful theory with predictive power.  The institutionalists certainly 
had a point when they insisted that economics cannot be separated from 
social science, history and even evolutionary biology.  But in the process of 
attempting to incorporate everything they gave up too much of the 
elegance that neoclassicism's rational expectations models produced.122 
 
                                                 
121.  Thorstein Veblen, Absentee Ownership and Business Enterprise in 
Recent Times: the Case of America (1923).  On the book's unfortunate history see 
Rosalind Schulman, Absentee Ownership Reread, 21 Am.J. Economics & 
Sociology 319 (1962) (reviewing Wesley Mitchell's "Lectures Notes on History of 
Economic Thought, 1934-1935"). 
122.  Institutionalism's modern stepchild is the much more technical New 
Institutional Economics (NIE), which combines neoclassical methodologies, 
including its mathematics, with an increased appreciation of institutions and a 
positive research agenda.  See Oliver E. Williamson, The new Institutional 
Economics: Taking Stock, Looking Ahead, 38 J.Econ.Lit. 595 (2000).  See also 
Kenneth J. Arrow, "Reflections on the Essays," in Arrow and the Foundations of 
the Theory of Economic Policy 727-734 (1987) (contrasting the old and new 
institutional economics and giving a similar explanation about why the old 
institutionalism failed). 
 
 For overviews see Handbook of New Institutional Economics (Claude 
Menard and Mary M. Shirley, eds., 2005); Eirik G. Furubotn and Rudolf Richter, 
Institutions and Economic Theory: The Contribution of the New Institutional 
Economics (1997); Thrainn Eggertsson, Economic Behavior and Institutions 
(1990). 
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 But in fact the separation of ownership and control is not a 
distinctively institutionalist notion.  It was embraced equally by marginalist 
neoclassicists.  The important difference was attitude.  For Berle and 
Means as well as Veblen, the separation of ownership and control was a 
serious economic and social problem, explaining why corporations did not 
act in either the interests of their shareholders or the public interest.  In 
sharp contrast, neoclassicists embraced the separation of ownership and 
control as a fundamental principle of efficient firm behavior.  Indeed, in the 
neoclassical model separation of ownership in control has become a virtual 
prerequisite to productive management and risk taking.123 
 
 The intellectual vehicle for neoclassicism's embrace of the 
separation of ownership and control was price theory.  After an early period 
in which welfare economics and price theory were regarded as concerned 
with a common set of questions about efficiency and wealth distribution, 
the "ordinalist" revolution separated them.124  Welfare economics became 
concerned with individual utility preferences under the constraint that 
utilities could not be quantified in a cardinal matter and interpersonally 
compared.  By contrast, price theory was concerned entirely with the 
maximization of wealth measured in a constant monetary unit such as 
dollars.  Critically, neoclassical price theory gives no regard to the 
observation that individual utility preferences might differ from wealth 
preferences, and for measuring market behavior this has proven to be a 
very powerful assumption.  Under marginalism, and in contrast to the work 
of Veblen or Berle & Means, neoclassical corporate finance theory 
unambiguously became a part of price theory, not a part of welfare 
economics.  Once made, that decision guaranteed that the idiosyncratic 
preferences of shareholders would be irrelevant within the neoclassical 
model. 
 
 An essential tenet of neoclassical theory was that a business firm, 
as any economic actor, maximizes profits, or value.  Further, value 
maximization is indifferent to the identity and distribution of either 
shareholder or manager identity. The entire thrust of neoclassical corporate 
finance theory was to turn the shareholder into nothing more than an 
investor, who was presumed to have no interest other than the 
maximization of value, no matter what his or her actual interest might be.  
                                                 
123.  See, e.g., Eugene F. Fama and Michael C. Jensen, Separation of 
Ownership and Control, 26 J.L.& Econ. 301 (1983); Mark J. Roe, Strong 
Managers, Weak Owners: the Political Roots of American Corporate Finance 
(1994). 
124.  Robert Cooter and Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about 
Welfare Economics?, 22 J.Econ.Lit. 507 (1984). 
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The manager became nothing more than the agent of profit-maximizing 
decision making.  Until the rise of agency cost models, which did not occur 
until after 1960, neoclassicism largely assumed the ownership/control 
problem away by positing that both the firm and its shareholders had only 
profit-maximization in mind.125 
 
 The neoclassical model simply assumed profit-maximization, quite 
apart from the wishes of managers, shareholders, creditors or anyone else 
that might be associated with a corporation.  Already in the first decade of 
the twentieth century the brilliant Yale neoclassicist Irving Fisher worked 
out the beginning details of what was to become his "separation 
theorem."126  Fisher assumed that shareholders have utility preferences 
that are not capable of being specified.  He then showed that in an efficient 
market for capital a business firm will choose value maximization as a 
strategy regardless of shareholders' utility preferences for dividends or 
reinvestment or their preferences as to how profits should be spent.127  The 
basic logic of the theorem is that the goal of the firm is always to maximize 
the size of overall returns, which thus gives the shareholders in the 
aggregate the maximum opportunity to spend the profits as they please.128  
                                                 
125.  See harold Demsetz, The Structure of ownership and the Theory of the 
Firm, 26 J.L.& Econ. 387 (1983).  See also George J. Stigler and Claire Friedland, 
The Literature of Economics: the Case of Berle and means, 26 J.L. & Econ. 241 
(1983). 
126.  Fisher worked the fundamental theory out in Irving Fisher, The Nature of 
Capital and Income (1906) and The Rate of Interest (1907), but he presented the 
mature theorem in Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by the 
Impatience to Spend income and Opportunity to Invest it (1930). 
127.  One statement of the theorem is: 
 
 Given perfect and complete capital markets, the production decision is 
governed solely by the profit-maximization objective, and the decision is 
separated from the consumption decision that is governed solely by utility-
maximization. 
 
For a moderately technical explanation of the theorem see "Irving Fisher's 
Theory of Investment," available at 
http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/essays/capital/fisherinvest.htm.  See also Richard 
A. Brealey, Stewart C. Myers and Franklin Allen, Principles of Corporate Finance 
(8th ed. 2006). 
128.  See Remus D. Valsan & Moin A. Yahya, Shareholders, Creditors, and 
Directors' Fiduciary Duties: A Law and Finance Approach, 2 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 1, 
35-36 (2007). 
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Today,  Fisher's separation theorem is regarded as a building block for the 
more general Modigliani-Miller (MM) theorem of corporate finance, 
developed in the 1950s, which states that in an efficient market for capital a 
firm's value is not a function of the way it is financed -- i.e, its ratio of debt 
to equity.  In this model the number, identity, or interests of shareholders 
became entirely irrelevant when the conditions of the theorem were 
satisfied.129 
 
 Neoclassical theory also recognized that firms might make 
inefficient choices, but it came to do so in the guise of "agency" costs.  
While a transaction cost is a cost of using a market, or producing an 
exchange between two independent actors, an agency cost is a cost of 
making a decision within the firm.130  For example, while neoclassicism saw 
nothing inherently inefficient in the separation of ownership and control, to 
the extent such separation did lead to inefficiencies they would be 
characterized as agency costs.  One value of the great theorems of 
corporate finance, such as Fisher's separation theorem or the Modigliani-
Miller theorem is that they worked in a market where agency costs were 
                                                 
129.  Franco Modigliani and Merton H. Miller, The cost of Capital, Corporation 
Finance and the Theory of Investment, 48 Am.Econ.Rev. 261 (1958).  See Franco 
Modigliani, 3 The Collected Papers of Franco Modigliani xiii (1980, A. Abel ed.): 
 
 with well-functioning markets (and neutral taxes) and rational investors, 
who can `undo' the corporate financial structure by holding positive or 
negative amounts of debt, the market value of the firm - debt plus equity - 
depends only on the income stream generated by its assets. It follows, in 
particular, that the value of the firm should not be affected by the share of 
debt in its financial structure or by what will be done with the returns - paid 
out as dividends or reinvested (profitably). 
 
Relatedly, see Harold Demsetz, The Structure of Ownership and Control and 
the Theory of the Firm, 26 J.L. & Econ. 375 (1983) (corporate performance does 
not depend on identity or configuration of shareholders); Harold Demsetz and 
Belen Villalonga, Ownership Structure and Corporate Performance, 7 J.Corp.Fin. 
209 (2001) (shareholders will eventually adopt the ownership for that maximizes 
returns). 
130.  The classic treatment is Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, 
Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 
3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976).  See also Ronald J. Gilson, Controlling Shareholders 
and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy, 119 Harv. 
L. Rev. 1641, 1651 (2006); Armen A. Alchian and Harold Demsetz (1972). 
Production, Information Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 Am.Econ.Rev. 777 
(1972).  For an excellent brief explication of the relationship between transaction 
costs in markets (separate economic actors) and agency costs within the firm, see 
Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 408, 416-418 (6th ed. 2003). 
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zero.  As a result, observers could identify problems with possible legal 
solutions by inquiring into situations were these costs were positive.131  As 
a result, agency costs performed the same role within the firm that 
transaction costs performed in the market -- by determining where legal 
policy could make a difference and then assigning legal entitlements in 
such a way so as to ensure weatlh maximizing outcomes.132 
 
Competition and Equity Markets: the Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis 
 
 The earliest neoclassical theorems in corporate finance, such as 
Irving Fisher's separation theorem, assumed that capital markets were 
efficient.  In fact, the roots of the modern Efficient Capital Market 
Hypothesis were developed in neoclassical marginalism early on.  As 
William Stanley Jevons observed already in the 1870s,133 people tend to 
equate their utilities: they purchase a good until the marginal utility of that 
good declines to the level they experience for some other good.  The 
corollary in finance is that people equate their returns.  Stocks became 
investment vehicles whose prices were calculated to produce the same 
level of return, once adjusted for risk.134 
 
 One very important difference between classical and neoclassical 
value theory lay in the treatment of risk and uncertainty.  Because 
classicism measured value by looking at past averages, the theory did not 
explicitly incorporate the risk of uncertain future events.  Things such as the 
value of labor or of a business firm were measured by reference to 
previous investment, and risk of future events did not formally fit into the 
theory.  To be sure, business persons investing in the nineteenth century 
certainly took anticipated risks into account, but the classical value model 
did not account for them. 
 
 In very sharp contrast, marginalism's criteria of willingness-to-pay, 
                                                 
131.  See Douglass C. North, Comment on Stigler and Friedland, 26 J.L.& 
Econ.  269 (1983) (arguing that Berle and Means were in fact the first to address 
the problem of agency costs within the corporation, and did so long before anyone 
else did so; noting that Ronald Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 Economica 386 
(1937), was published five years later). 
132.  The Coase Theorem operates to like effect in markets.  See Ronald 
Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L.& Econ. 1 (1960). 
133.  See discussion supra, text at notes __. 
134.  See, e.g., Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 64-66 (1921). 
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or expected value, almost always involved a certain amount of uncertainty.  
For longer run investments or less stable markets the uncertainty could be 
considerable.  Figuring out how to accommodate uncertainty about the 
future into economic modeling proved to a central problem of neoclassical 
economics in the first half of the twentieth century. 
 
 Before modern corporate finance theory could emerge several 
things had to be worked out.  First, marginalism had to develop a robust 
theory of competition.  Because of its forward looking nature that was a 
theory in which information, risk, and uncertainty acquired heightened 
importance.  Second, this theory had to be applied to the corporate equity 
market.  Finally, this theory, coupled with a set of empirical studies of 
commodity and stock market behavior, led to the formulation of the Efficient 
Capital Market Hypothesis. 
 
 The initial impact of marginalist economics was a great deal of 
doubt about the competitiveness and even the robustness of markets, and 
many of the earliest marginalists abandoned the commitment to free 
markets that was explicit in classical political economy.  Some even toyed 
with socialism as an alternative to free markets.135  Prominent 
neoclassicists backtracked considerably from the classical hostility toward 
economic regulation.136  Major technical controversies within neoclassical 
economics served to create significant doubts about the efficiency of 
markets.137 
 
 Gradually neoclassicism was able to work out the details of a more-
or-less robust model of competition, although the domain of so-called 
"perfect competition" within marginalism was never as broad as the 
classicists faith that strenuous competition prevailed in virtually every 
market.  The neoclassicists had to deal with numerous complexities that 
the marginalist model contemplated, such as increasing returns to scale, 
                                                 
135.  See John W. Mason, Political Economy and the Response to Socialism 
in Britain, 1870-1914, 23 Historical J. 565 (1980). 
136.  See William S. Jevons, The State in Relation to Labour 1-21 (1882).  See 
also Henry Sidgwick, The Principles of Political Economy 518-544 (1887) 
(prominent marginalist criticizing laissez faire position of the classicists).  On the 
attitudes of early marginalists toward wealth distribution see Robert Cooter and 
Peter Rappoport, Were the Ordinalists Wrong about Welfare Economics?, 22 
J.Econ.Lit. 507 (1984). 
137.  See Herbert Hovenkamp, Enterprise and American Law, 1836-1937, at 
chs. 22-25 (1991); and see,e.g., Joan Robinson, The Economics of Imperfect 
Competition (1933); Edward Chamberlin, Theory of Monopolistic Competition 
(1933). 
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which gave larger firms a cost advantage over smaller ones,138 and product 
differentiation, which generally made marginal cost pricing unworkable.139  
In addition, marginalist corporate finance theory had to work out some 
important problems regarding the relationship between a business firm's 
market incentives, its selection of sources of capital, and the possibly quite 
separate incentives of its stockholders.  The Fisher separation theorem 
discussed above was an important first step. 
 
 As the modern neoclassical model of perfect competition developed 
through the first half of the twentieth century the role of information became 
increasingly important.  Perfect competition depended on markets with a 
fairly large number of buyers and sellers, lack of significant scale 
economies, and the free flow of information.  University of Chicago 
economist Frank Knight stressed it in his important 1921 book Risk, 
Uncertainty and Profit, which identified the costless flow of information as a 
precondition to effective competition.140  In addition, Knight introduced the 
concepts of risk and certainty as inherent in marginalism's emphasis on 
reasonable expectations.  For Knight "risk" referred to variations in the 
future whose probability was knowable.  With good foreknowledge of 
probabilities risks could be traded under competitive conditions.  For 
example, a precisely one in ten chance of making a $1000 oil discover is 
worth $100.  In contrast, "uncertainty" referred to future events whose 
probability could not be known.  In such cases investors would demand a 
premium as compensation for exposure to an adverse outcome whose 
chance of occurrence was unknowable. 
 
 Many of the early marginalists viewed the stock market with 
suspicion, regarding it as not conforming to the usual laws of supply and 
demand. Certainly the boom-bust stock price cycles of the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century served to frustrate application of 
basic competition theory to stock pricing.  Prices appeared to gyrate wildly, 
with no apparent relation to the value of the underlying firm.141  Under this 
                                                 
138.  See Henry Carter Adams, "Relation of the State to Industrial Action," 1 
Pub., Am. Econ. Assn. 7, 52, 59-64 (1887) (arguing that industries subject to 
significant scale economies must be regulated by the government).  See also 
Hovenkamp, Enterprise, note __ at Ch. 23. 
139.  See Chamberlin, note __. 
140.  Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit 78-87 (1921). 
141.  See, e.g., John Maynard Keynes, General Theory of Employment, 
Interest and Money, Ch. 12 (1936) (arguing that stock market operates as a kind of 
"beauty contest" in which shares prices were based not on fundamental value but 
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line of thinking technical analysis flourished, with stock traders hoping to 
pick winners by trying to find predictable similarities in past pricing 
behavior.142 
 
 But a more theoretical purist strand in neoclassical economics 
developed the view that, notwithstanding the frenzy with which stocks are 
often purchased and sold, overall pricing tends to reflect fundamental 
values.  For example, Yale economist Irving Fisher, author of the 
separation theorem, consistently argued that stock prices reflected intrinsic 
values in which returns to stocks operated as an "implied" rate of interest in 
which owners were compensated with higher returns in exchange for taking 
on greater risk.143  John Burr Williams also insisted that the price of shares 
reflected the intrinsic value that they represented -- namely, objectively 
reasonable expectations of future earnings and dividends.  Mathematically, 
the value of a corporation is the expected value of its stream of future 
earnings.144  Building on Williams' work, University of California economist 
Harry Markowitz then developed the idea that the development of an 
optimal portfolio of stocks consists in selecting stocks of differing risk 
levels, and that riskier investments were offset by higher rates of return, 
although greater variability as well.145 
 
 The efficient capital market hypothesis was very much constructed 
                                                                                                                            
rather one each buyer's prediction of what valuation others would place on a firm's 
shares).  See also John Hicks, Value and Capital: An Inquiry into some 
Fundamental Principles of Economic Theory (1939); Robert Rhea, The Dow 
Theory (1932). 
142.  See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Speculation Economy: How Finance 
Triumphed over Industry 274 (San Francisco: BK Pub., 2007). 
143.  Irving Fisher, The Rate of Interest 10 (1907) (speaking of an "implied rate 
of interest" in stocks that reflect the investor's anticipation of returns; see also id. at 
216, on the differential returns of stocks and bonds, noting that the intrinsic value 
of stocks is such as to produce a higher rate or return because they are also 
accompanied by more risk).  More than two decades later Fisher returned to the 
same themes. Irving Fisher, The Theory of Interest: As Determined by the 
Impatience to Spend Income and Opportunity to Invest It (1930). 
 
 See also Benjamin Graham and D.L. Dodd, Security Analysis: Principles 
and Technique (1951) (emphasizing a strategy of "value investing" by studying 
fundamentals in search of undervalued stocks). 
144.  John Burr Williams, Theory of Investment Value (1938). 
145.  See Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.Finance 77 (1952). 
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on the marginalist theory of perfect competition, in which every market 
participant is a price taker and the price of a stock quickly moves toward an 
equilibrium that tends to equalize its risk adjusted return to that of other 
stocks and financial instruments.146  The thinking developed in stages, from 
the observation that returns at the margin will be equalized; to the 
observation that to the extent the market discounts all information about a 
stock into the price the current price is always the "correct" one; to the 
observation that even high risk and low risk stocks should produce the 
same return in the long run because high risk will be compensated through 
a stock price that yields a higher return.147  As a result, any randomly 
selected mixture of stocks should perform just as well as any other similarly 
diversified mixture. 
 
 From that point the only missing ingredient was informational 
efficiency -- or the idea that the market price of a security is a reflection of 
the information that is publicly known about it.  To the extent that 
information is both accurate and relatively quickly disseminated this price 
will tend to reflect rational expectations about fundamental value.148  
Already in 1900 Louis Bachelier, a French mathematician, had written a 
doctoral dissertation entitled The Theory of Speculation, arguing that the 
history of commodity prices shows that they are in fact randomly 
distributed, making it impossible to predict future prices from past price 
                                                 
146.  See Jean-Jacques Laffont and Eric S. Maskin, The Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and Insider Trading on the Stock Market, 98 J.Pol.Econ. 70 (1990), 
who notes that the ECMH assumes nearly perfect competition and breaks down 
under oligopoly, where prices and the release of information may be strategic.  If 
transaction costs are positive or there are serious asymmetries in information then 
various versions of the hypothesis may not apply. 
147.  Harry Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, 7 J.Fin. 77 (1952). 
148.  Eugene F. Fama's doctoral dissertation, often credited with assembling 
the data and proofs that created the modern efficient market hypothesis, was 
published as Eugene F. Fama, The Behavior of Stock-Market Prices, 38 J.Bus. 34 
(1965).  See also Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory 
and Empirical Work, 25 J.Finance 383 (1970) (initially proposing the "strong," 
"semi-strong" and "weak" forms of the efficient market hypothesis.  See also 
Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets II, J. Finance 1575 (1991); Eugene F. 
Fama, Foundations of Finance (1976).  See also Sanford Grossman, The 
Informational Role of Prices (1989). 
 
 On the history of the efficient market hypothesis, see Michael C. Jensen 
and Clifford W. Smith, Jr., The Modern Theory of Corporate Finance 2-20 (1984). 
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histories.149  Beginning in the 1930s a number of studies suggested the 
same thing for stock prices.150  For example, detailed recording of a series 
of throws of a single die provides information that there is a one in six 
chance of getting a five, but no sequence in historical throws provides any 
useful information about predicting a sequence in future throws.  As a 
result an efficient investor might as well forget the research and purchase 
shares without even a minimal knowledge of a firm's business or its 
prospects. 
 
 In his now famous doctoral dissertation Eugene Fama assembled 
this theory about competition, information dispersion as well as the 
empirical studies of pricing behavior into what has become known as the 
efficient capital market hypothesis (ECMH).  The hypothesis states in its 
most generalized version that in any market in which information flows 
without restraint current market prices reflect investors' collective beliefs 
about the value of the goods that are being traded.  While ECMH can be 
applied to any market that satisfies its conditions and has frequently been 
applied to commodities markets,151 its main impact has been in the analysis 
of stock market pricing.  The ECMH comes in three versions: weak, 
semistrong, and strong.  The weak version states that current prices reflect 
all the information contained from observations of previous investment 
prices.  As a result, historical pricing information is not useful for predicting 
future pricing, making so-called "technical" analysis from price movements 
useless as a predictor of future prices.  Under the semistrong version 
current prices reflect all public information, including technical information 
but also information pertaining to "fundamentals," which is information 
about the performance and prospects of a firm, its assets and liabilities, 
P/E ratio, and the like.  If you learn something about a firm in the 
newspaper the market price has already reflected that news and trading on 
                                                 
149.  Louis Bachelier, The Theory of Speculation [1900] (reprint edition, 
Princeton Univ. Press, 2006). 
150.  See Holbrook Working, A Random Difference Series for Use in the 
Analysis of Time Series, 29 J. Am.Statistical Assn. 11 (1934) (stock prices 
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Commodity Futures Markets: A Survey, 39 Rev.Marketing Agricultural Econ. 3 
(1972).  
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it is of no use.  Further, there is no point studying a firm's fundamentals in 
order to identify under- or over-valued stocks.  Thus neither technical 
analysis nor fundamental analysis will work.  Finally, the strong form adds 
to this that even private information is discounted into the stock price.  As a 
result even information from such activities as insider trading will be 
included.152 
 
 Both the strong and the semistrong strong version of EMCH have 
strong policy implications for corporate disclosure and finance.  Principally, 
the mitigate strongly against hard regulation, although in favor of disclosure 
of information.153  With respect to information, mandatory disclosure is 
more important for smaller companies than for larger publicly traded 
companies that are likely to be followed by a large number of analysts.154  
In general, the amount of regulation of information that should be supplied 
varies inversely with the amount of information actually available and 
disseminated by private analysts.155  Finally, the type of financing a firm 
chooses, or its production or expansion decisions will always be reflected 
in the market price, thus making command-and-control regulation largely 
unnecessary.156 
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Theory, 52 Alb.L.Rev. 923 1989). 
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Conclusion: the Separation of Ownership and Awareness: 
 
 The result of marginalist finance theory was to take Berle and 
Means' separation of corporate ownership and control one step further, to 
the separation of ownership and awareness.  In an efficient capital market 
investors can maximize their returns without even knowing anything about 
the products a firm makes or the markets in which it operates.  A random 
selection of stocks produces the same return as the most careful 
research.157  Indeed, under the strong version of ECMH even the actions of 
managers become irrelevant because they will immediately be reflected in 
the stock price as well.  The effect was to move the shareholder in the 
publicly traded corporation to the furthest extent possible from the 
nineteenth century vision of the classical corporation as a device for limiting 
liability and facilitating investment by a group of active owner-operators.  
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